MiG-25 vs F-4 in Iran-Iraq war

Read the forum code of contact

Member for

22 years 7 months

Posts: 11,742

If the distance of the targets was the only important factor during the War of 1973 there should have been dozens of MiG 21 flying over the cities from Israel.

Even without knowing it in 1980, since the Iraq Air Force participated in the 1973 against Israel, it had opted to launch attacks at high altitude with its "ineffective"(please have mercy that its not my opinion) MiG-25RB against the oil facilities of Kharg Island, instead of opting for the MiG-21 or even the dedicated fighter-bombers as Su-22M3K and MiG-23BK , or even by its bombers Tu-16 Badger or else supersonic bombers Tu-22 Blinder.

In fact I did not understand what this means: "None wasted his anti-ship capability against the much less important naval units", since according to several sources the Iraq Air Force had launched over 200 anti ship missiles AM-39 Exocet against naval targets.

As I told before I do not know how to do math, so I guess the number is greater than the sum of all the anti ship missiles launched by aircraft in battle since Germans had developed this method during the II World War.

To stay serious. The Yom Kippur War was a limited war with military targets only.
The Irakis had two Hunter squadrons in Egypt and five squadrons of Su-7, MiG-17 and MiG-21 in Syria during that war.
In 1980-88 naval targets were merchant ships like tankers at first. In 1980 there were no MiG-25RB in Iraq.

Monday 22 September 1980 two Iraqi airstrikes on Iranian air force bases and early warning stations opened that war both sides had no idea about its future outcome or real target.
Thursday 25 September 1980 the Iranians were the first by attacking Iraqi oil-installations at Kirkuk and Mosul.
Sunday 28 September 1980 the Iranians did a similar attack at Mosul and Suleinanya oilfields, when the Iraqi attacked the Kharg Island oil terminal the first time with Sukhoi 20s.
Tuesday 30 September 1980 Iraqi MiGs hit Bandur Sharpur naval base.
None party had a real war-plan to follow.

The first encounter between MiG-25 vs F-4 in that war was not possible before late summer 1981.

Member for

9 years 5 months

Posts: 783

By 1985 the Iran Air Force were weakened by the war which had been dragging on for nearly five years. Though the same was able to maintain balance with the Iraq Air Force, which had constantly been strengthened with new equipment's and tactics along almost five years of war.

Iran's fleet of 300+ BVR capable long range fighters didn't do much against Iraq's antiquated MiG21 / SU-20 / Hunter force in 1980... By 1985, Iraq was technologically still behind Iran in air power... but that was not reflected in operational use.

In general all of the main types of combat aircraft's from Iran (F 4D/E, F 5E/F and F 14A ) had been recorded losses, but the most significant loss were still about to occur, since the lifetime of the air-air long range missile AIM 54A Phoenix were nearing the end in 1985.

most of the Iranian losses happened in the early years, against day-only WVR-only short ranged Iraqi fighters and SAMs.

Without the missiles AIM 54A the F 14A Tomcat would be equipped with only medium range AIM 7E Sparrow and would be overwhelmed by the MiG-25 Foxbat PDS from Iraq with its long-range missiles AA 6 Acrid, besides the MiG-25RB attack/reconnaissance would have leave way in strike missions against strategic targets in Iran.

Iraqis never had an issue with sending even MiG23BN to strike Iran... Tomcat or no tomcat.

In the same way that the supersonic bombers Tu 22 Blinder would be escorted by MiG 25 PDS from Iraq it could be able to crush the oil facilities on the Kharg island , where Iran exported most all of the its oil leading Iran to the collapse.

such a thing never happened...

As well as subsonic bombers H 6D (Chinese version of the Tu 16 Badger) equipped with anti ship missiles C 601 should be protected by MiG 25PDS could attack and sink the frigates and destroyers from Iranian Navy that would eventually escorting the oil tankers along the Persian Gulf.

Iraqi B6D bombers always flew WITHOUT ANY ESCORT. and only one was lost after many dozens of long range maritime attacks...

In the case of Tu 22 Blinder if this had receive those anti ship missiles with supersonic and long-range capabilities of the Kh 22 Kitchen's, in that case the Iran Navy would be completely swept from the seas, allowing tactical aviation from Iraq to concentrate on sinking oil tankers with the same free-fall bombs.

ehm? neither side had the capability to stop shipping coming in. Neither the Iraqi nor iranian navies nor air forces could enforce any true "embargo".

Despite the air cover from F 4D/E Phantom II and F 14A Tomcat for the convoys from Iran the anti ship missile AM 39 Exocet had become the main means from Iraq Air Force to defeat the Iran Navy, and the Exocet could be launched by fight bomber Super Entendard or after the Mirage F1EQ5, besides the Super Frelon helicopters.

no. The main means for fighting Iranian NAVY was by MiG21s carrying rocket pods and OSA-II boats firing silkworms...

The effectiveness of such attacks from Exocet was not starring as had happened in the War of Falklands on 1982, since the large tankers could resisted the damage caused by the 'light' warhead of 165 kg (360 lb) from subsonic AM 39 so much better than the medium-sized vessels such as destroyers from the Royal Navy in 1982.

wow! true indeed!

For oil tankers would be ideal employment of large subsonic missile C 601 with warhead of 513 kg (1120 lb) that could be launched by Xian H 6D, or supersonic and then the most expensive Kh 22 Kitchen launched by Tu 22 Blinder with warhead of 1000 kg (2180 lb) . In fact several oil tankers hit by AM 39 did not sink, and once repaired had returned to active allowing the continued export of oil from Iran during the War.

Dozens did sink... main effect though was increasing insurance premiums... neither side could effectively strangle the other.

Since that ships convoys had been protected by Phantoms and Tomcats there no favorable opportunity to strike with H 6D or Tu 22, or even about to strike with the fighter bomber ( MiG 23BK, Su 22M3K or Mirage F1Q) with free fall bombs that should be more effective than the Exocet, but the AM 39 Exocet at least gave at the Mirage F 1EQ5 the possibiliy to strike and escape from the escorts ships with SAM( Surface Air Missiles) or from Phantons and Tomcats, almost allways...

not true... most attacks were with free fall bombs from SU-22s.

To avoid detection by radar from escort ships from Iran Navy and missiles as SAM RIM 66 Standard that were equipped some Iranian ships, the Iraq fighter equipped with AM 39 Exocet had to fly at low altitude over the sea as the same way that Super Entendard from Argentine Navy made in 1982.

not necessary... most strike packages over the gulf were at medium altitude.

However on the Falklands War the Royal Navy had the Sea Harrier with only short-range missiles AIM 9L Sidewinder to protect the fleet, and this time lacked the F 4E Phantom II equipped with medium-range missiles AIM 7E Sparrow, or even the F 14A Tomcat with long-range missiles AIM 54A Phoenix giving coverage to the fleet with the NATO.

the F14s hardly came up to fight ever... except in a some mythical books uncorroborated by Iraqi numbers.

While the ships from Royal Navy Fleet dreaming about the Phantoms and Tomcats to protect them, the subsonic Sea Harrier only equipped with news short range missiles AIM 9P had faced the nightmare that were the threat from Argentine Air Force and its Navy Air Force to the Royal Navy Fleet. The highly effective all-aspect short range AIM 9P Sidewinder from Sea Harrier were borrowed by U.S. as emergency measure in 1982 because the war with 100 units delivered.

ok. but F14 / F4 without AWACS hardly protected Iran from anything (see "preying mantis").. all it showed was that the Iraqis were incapable of concentrating sufficient firepower and bombing accuracy to wreck Iran's economy... no need for F4 / F14.

Without the resources from oil exported the ailing economy from Iran would collapse as well as the capacity of maintaining military operations during the war with Iraq, which would certainly lead Iraq to victory .

not really.

Despite the priority of maintaining the already had been reduced stock of the missiles AIM 54A Phoenix in operation, in fact Iran failed to get on the "open market" same items that were critical for those missiles, and this was the thermal battery , since the depletion of useful life from this was responsible for getting the missile out of the operation.

yawn. stop obsessing about the "AIM-54" it really wasn't particularly good...

The thermal battery were responsible for generating the power electricity had consumed from missile when its flew for the target, even though this item is not something new, however in the case of AIM 54 the level technology this item was advanced to this time, which led to the U.S. being only capable of producing the required standards for the AIM 54 Phoenix.

doubt it.

There weren't similar items on the "open market", at least in small dimensions to fit in the compact airframe of the AIM 54.The Phoenix were missiles with active radar and long range, which demanded a high power consumption, several times higher than that of a passive radar-guided missile (SARH) even larger as the SAM MIN 23 Hawk or SAM RIM 66 Standard .

ok, erm??

Thus emerged in Iran two programs designed to replenish the lack of AIM 54A Phoenix, one of these was to make compatible the missile system SAM MIN 23 Hawk for F 14A Tomcat, and the other was a missile from SAM system RIM 66 Standard to the F 4E Phantom II.

In case the SAM Hawk for the F 14A the program would be quite complex, since it were intended to transform the missile semi-active radar Hawk into active radar, since the idea was to "transplant" the active radar homing seeker of the "agonizing" AIM 54A Phoenix to the Hawk with dimensions compatible with a new thermal battery with larger seize, those would be available in the market in order to meet the high demand of electricity in the guidance system of the AIM 54A Phoenix long-range interceptions that would be impossible to fit into AIM 54 airframe . The Sky Hawk program would end in a hybrid between the Hawk and Phoenix.

no, those were just propaganda things for internal consumption...

Regarding SAM Standard for the F 4E Phantom II the program these were previous for the War, and was initiated by Israel with code-name Distant Thunder Program in conjunction with Iran in the late '70s. Faced with the threat of the MiG-25 and Tu 22 equipped with powerfull ECM systems, the combination Phantom II and AIM 7E would not be effective, and the idea was to transform the missiles RIM 66 Standad to be launched by F 4E Phantom II, however beyond the previous SARH ( Semi Active Radar Homing) capability of the Standard would have addressing the anti radiation capability in the case of ECM( Eletronic Counter Measure) from enemy aircraft jammed the radar from Phantom.

eh? so how come they couldn't handle TU16s and even Il-76s!!! regularly bombing Iran without any escort to speak of?

Israel had at the time the anti radiation missile AGM 78 for SEAD( Supression Enemy Air Defense) missions that were based on the Standard missile, and it hoped to transform both the AGM 78 with new SARH as secondary mode capability as the Standard with anti radiation secondary mode capability.

The join program from Israel and Iran was only ended after the U.S. agreed to provide AIM 7F for the F 15 Eagle to Israel with the secondary mode capability( High Classified) to lock the emissions ECM, as well as the AIM 54A Phoenix for F 14A Tomcat with this same secondary mode anti radiation capability. Even the radars from F 15 and F 14 had been jammed by ECM, the missiles AIM 7F and AIM 54A should be guided to the ECM source as anti radiation missile into this secondary mode and destroy the target with ECM source, in case of this ECM source were in range of missiles .

In 1986 apparently those two programs from Iran as Standard and Sky Hawk could have been cancelled after the U.S. supplied spare parts for AIM 54A Phoenix, as well as many other items to Iran in 1985, which eventually triggered the scandal of the Iran Gates after that were discovered by the press, with problable same help from ...

aha?

However as the program of the Standard for the F 4E Phantom II were more advanced than the program Sky Hawk of F 14A Tomcat since as the first had begun in the late '70s, the rumors that it reached the stage when it were used against real targets, those could be the MiG 25RB from Iraq in attack missions against oil terminal from Kharg Island.

??

The Standard when launched by F 4E could reach the range more than twice of the AIM 7E range, which would put the MiG 25RB easily into range to be shoot down by the F 4E. Indeed the Iranians always reported that the Standard F 4E had the purpose to be used as anti ship missiles, and some attacks against ships had been made for this purpose.

However the suspect those anti ship missions with Standard launched by Phantom had only the purpose of concealing the true mission that would be intercept the MiG 25RB or others aircraft as Tu 22 and H 6D, since the fleet of Tomcat were too reduced to protect many targets, and the Phantom with Standard missiles could eventually complement the F 14A with AIM 54 missiles, specially in the defense of the Kharg Island as well the oil tankers.

kharg was protected by PHANTOMs according to Iraqis...

At least one Tu 22 Blinder was shot down over the Kharg Island by Phantom II, and that Phantom did it supposedly with AIM 7E Sparrow missile, however the Tu 22 Blinder were well equipped with ECM, and in 1988 Iraq was quite experienced to interfere with radars of F 4E with AIM 7E with high efficiency.A suspect this way and that in fact Tu 22 was shot down by a modified Standard with the capability to be guided to the ECM source even if the radar F 4E had been suffering interference by the enemy jammer. Those Standards could have been modified with spare parts sent by US to AIM 54 in 1985, but diverged to the Standard program

most iraqi blinders were shot down at the beginning of the war.

Regarding the MiG 25RB attack/reconnaissance fighter there no indication that any were shot down by an F 4E Phantom II during the Iran / Iraq War at least with missiles AIM 7E. Before the war some sources had speculated that F 4E from Iran indeed were capable to damage a MiG 25R from Soviet Union that invaded the airspace of Iran with missiles AIM 7E Sparrow after several failed attempts.

I-HAWK is what shot down Iraqi MiG25RBs...

Despite possible still in fact there was a huge difference between the MiG 25R reconnaissance fighter to the MiG 25RB attack/reconnaissance , since this last one were second generation compared to MiG 25R, and were endowed with a powerful ECM system. In fact after the introduction of the MiG 25RB the first generation MiG 25R were gradually converted to the default MiG 25RB.

no there isn't.

However the invasions of the Soviet Union's MiG-25RB only had been ceased after the first encounter with the F 14A Tomcat from Iran, in which AIM 54A Phoenix fell in love by the MiG 25.

Did this really happen?

Member for

14 years

Posts: 516

To stay serious. The Yom Kippur War was a limited war with military targets only.
The Irakis had two Hunter squadrons in Egypt and five squadrons of Su-7, MiG-17 and MiG-21 in Syria during that war.
In 1980-88 naval targets were merchant ships like tankers at first. In 1980 there were no MiG-25RB in Iraq.

Monday 22 September 1980 two Iraqi airstrikes on Iranian air force bases and early warning stations opened that war both sides had no idea about its future outcome or real target.
Thursday 25 September 1980 the Iranians were the first by attacking Iraqi oil-installations at Kirkuk and Mosul.
Sunday 28 September 1980 the Iranians did a similar attack at Mosul and Suleinanya oilfields, when the Iraqi attacked the Kharg Island oil terminal the first time with Sukhoi 20s.
Tuesday 30 September 1980 Iraqi MiGs hit Bandur Sharpur naval base.
None party had a real war-plan to follow.

The first encounter between MiG-25 vs F-4 in that war was not possible before late summer 1981.

According to Iranian sources the first meeting between the MiG 25 PDS / RB with F 4E Phantom had occurred two hours after the start of the Iraq offensive on 22 September, when the Phantom counter-attacked Al Shaibah Air Base near of the city of Basra. However the version from Iranians the MiG 25 Foxbat in Al Shaibah were not from Iraq, but from Soviet Union despite has been wearing the marks from Iraqi Air Force since then.

Maybe one possibility for the MiG 25RB attack/reconnaissance and MiG 25 PDS interceptors, besides the MiG 23 ML that were in Al Shaibah would be those soviet fighters could support the offensive from Iraq Air Force to block the Iran harbors, in special the Kharg island.

With the attack and destruction of the largest oil refinery of the world, and this was the Iranian facility near the border of Iraq, Iran early in the war had lost half of its refining oil capacity , besides all its production of aviation fuel.

Thus the Iran at the beginning of the conflict had became dependent from imported fuels, and the terminal of Kharg Island became doubly strategic, since for this terminal were exported almost all the oil from Iran, as well as the necessary fuels for the war effort.

However since the counter attack from Iran on September 22 and 23 against Al Shaibah the supposed plan to cut off the Iran from the sea had became almost useless, since the Soviet Union departure from Al Shaibah AB to H 3 AB far away from Iran Air Force.

The Iraq supposedly had a good plan to win the war in the short term, however if was a good plan what had failed?

Member for

22 years 7 months

Posts: 11,742

According to Iranian sources the first meeting between the MiG 25 PDS / RB with F 4E Phantom had occurred two hours after the start of the Iraq offensive on 22 September, when the Phantom counter-attacked Al Shaibah Air Base near of the city of Basra. However the version from Iranians the MiG 25 Foxbat in Al Shaibah were not from Iraq, but from Soviet Union despite has been wearing the marks from Iraqi Air Force since then.

Maybe one possibility for the MiG 25RB attack/reconnaissance and MiG 25 PDS interceptors, besides the MiG 23 ML that were in Al Shaibah would be those soviet fighters could support the offensive from Iraq Air Force to block the Iran harbors, in special the Kharg island.

With the attack and destruction of the largest oil refinery of the world, and this was the Iranian facility near the border of Iraq, Iran early in the war had lost half of its refining oil capacity , besides all its production of aviation fuel.

Thus the Iran at the beginning of the conflict had became dependent from imported fuels, and the terminal of Kharg Island became doubly strategic, since for this terminal were exported almost all the oil from Iran, as well as the necessary fuels for the war effort.

However since the counter attack from Iran on September 22 and 23 against Al Shaibah the supposed plan to cut off the Iran from the sea had became almost useless, since the Soviet Union departure from Al Shaibah AB to H 3 AB far away from Iran Air Force.

The Iraq supposedly had a good plan to win the war in the short term, however if was a good plan what had failed?

Your problem is you do not verify claims from a single source and got trapped more than once

Monday 22 September 1980 the Iraqis made two airstrikes against six-ten Iranian ABs and two early warning sites. The Iranian AF retaliates quickly with a few F-4s by attacking two Iraqi ABs.
Non reliable source claimed Iraqi MiG-25s and at least no Russian ones. Decades later in the web some Russian nationalist started to rewrite history. They had not calculated the total defeat of Saddam and a free society in Iraq so soon. Something similar has happened to former Iranian claims.
Tuesday 23 September 6 Iraqi divisions did attack......
Wednesday 24 September the Iran has recovered from the first surprise and 150 Iranian sorties were flown that day.

The Iranian AF was in a bad personal shape by the internal politics. Several members, pilots were sentenced to prison and Iran was caught unaware and suffered a tactical surprise. Who was to blame for that?! Contrary to their own claims, they operated much fewer fighters and some strikes were flown by flights and not squadrons as claimed.

Kharg Island oil-terminal becomes a target for the Iraqi fighters, when the Iranians had flown air attacks on Iraki oil-installations some days before.
Saddams idea was to seize Khusestan within a week and seek for a ceasefire afterwards.

In general that Russian speaking web-site is your single source and used by others before for the same purpose. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_247.shtml

Member for

14 years

Posts: 516

Your problem is you do not verify claims from a single source and got trapped more than once

In general that Russian speaking web-site is your single source and used by others before for the same purpose. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_247.shtml

It would be great if my problem was only believe in a single source. With respect to fall into traps, at least some must believe that I should be a fan of it, because of the countless times that falls into a trap. But I'm still here, at least for now ...

As we all know the first rule of counterintelligence is to discredit the source of the information, however the fact may I have mentioned this on others occasions that was the fact that this source are free to access, but would not be the only one as I have mentioned numerous times, still I will reveal only in the end...

The Psychology has shown that we all have a tendency to search for facts that collaborate with our opinion previous established, namely that by nature we are prone to ignore information that cause conflicts with our beliefs.

The problem about this could be that many of our convictions could have been established in bases very fragile, perhaps due to immaturity or even ideological indoctrination as examples, but still they will "fight to the last man" to stay alive if they are challenged.:mad:

Regarding the Iran / Iraq War in accordance with the opinion of many this was a conflict between the totalitarian governments that spared no efforts from their respective populations to sacrifice them for victory, which would explain the 1 million dead and destroyed infrastructure that costs around the U$ 350 Billion dollars in the values from decade of 80's.

If the dead and wounded were mostly Iraqis and Iranians, the all cost of the war was much higher than that were calculated for Iran and Iraq, since there weren't only those billions of dollars from Iraq and Iran that were lost with the conflict for long eight years .:sleeping:

In a coveted spot as troubled like the Persian Gulf is not easy to find sources of information that are not aligned with some interests that have no interest in anything remotely close to the truth.:sleeping:

In my pathetic opinion :stupid: I think(in rare moments) it is interesting to analyze the of Iran/Iraq War beyond the fighting in the trenches as the First World War, and seek information about the technological war t which also occurred in this conflict, since this may be useful lessons for the present.

However as they say that "knowledge is power", I do not believe that all those who have it will share, so it is often necessary to dig deep, besides taking care not to end up buried.:dev2:

Someone getting closer about a possible answer, but still lack confidence in it, so the question remains:

The Iraq supposedly had a good plan to win the war in the short term, however if was a good plan what had failed?

Member for

22 years 7 months

Posts: 11,742

Please give the source and the related link you claim for "However the version from Iranians the MiG 25 Foxbat in Al Shaibah.." for the benefit of all intrested ones. So all of those will have the opportunity to verify it by themselves.

Member for

22 years 7 months

Posts: 11,742

http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=30.426111,47.642778&q=loc:30.426111,47.642778&hl=en&t=h&z=15
http://toolserver.org/~geohack/geohack.php?pagename=Shaibah_Air_Base&params=30_25_34_N_047_38_34_E_&title=Shaibah+AB

In the meanwhile everyone has the technical help from the web to verify former claims by his own.

That AB was in ~10 km distance of Basra Airport, ~30 km distance from the Iranian border and ~50 km distance from Abadan Airport. In short no place to hide something prominent as the MiG-25. It can not be operated undetected in short and Iraqi markings had changed nothing about that.

http://toolserver.org/~geohack/geohack.php?pagename=Shaibah&params=30_24_N_47_38_E_region:IQ_type:city_source:GNS-enwiki ... is the site of the former RAF station nearby.

http://i15.photobucket.com/albums/a355/merlinmagic28/FencerShaibah.jpg ... here are the remains of the most capable fighter based there in the late 80s.
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/tpc/txu-pclmaps-oclc-22834566_h-6b.jpg

Here are the related area of intrest covering the main area of fighting 1980-88. So everyone can get an idea about the distances. Despite claims from both sides the number of real combat missions was limited the nominal number of combat aircraft from both sides in mind.

Member for

9 years 5 months

Posts: 783

According to Iranian sources the first meeting between the MiG 25 PDS / RB with F 4E Phantom had occurred two hours after the start of the Iraq offensive on 22 September, when the Phantom counter-attacked Al Shaibah Air Base near of the city of Basra. However the version from Iranians the MiG 25 Foxbat in Al Shaibah were not from Iraq, but from Soviet Union despite has been wearing the marks from Iraqi Air Force since then.

Maybe one possibility for the MiG 25RB attack/reconnaissance and MiG 25 PDS interceptors, besides the MiG 23 ML that were in Al Shaibah would be those soviet fighters could support the offensive from Iraq Air Force to block the Iran harbors, in special the Kharg island.

The number of MiG25 and MiG23ML in Iraq in 1980 was exactly 0.

With the attack and destruction of the largest oil refinery of the world, and this was the Iranian facility near the border of Iraq, Iran early in the war had lost half of its refining oil capacity , besides all its production of aviation fuel.

Thus the Iran at the beginning of the conflict had became dependent from imported fuels, and the terminal of Kharg Island became doubly strategic, since for this terminal were exported almost all the oil from Iran, as well as the necessary fuels for the war effort.

Iraq's petrochemical complex was also destroyed during that period... you didn't mention that? In fact since you read only thinly veiled Iranian propaganda... you probably didn't even know about that...

However since the counter attack from Iran on September 22 and 23 against Al Shaibah the supposed plan to cut off the Iran from the sea had became almost useless, since the Soviet Union departure from Al Shaibah AB to H 3 AB far away from Iran Air Force.

None of this actually happened. There were no soviets in Shuaibah. It was a forward base in 1980 operating MiG21s and Hunters. There was a group of Indian Air Force instructors there... the only foreign presence.

The Iraq supposedly had a good plan to win the war in the short term, however if was a good plan what had failed?

The plan was not to win any "war" but to maintain power... Islamic Republic of Iran funded the Da'wa party (shia islamists) in Iraq to overthrow Saddam's baathist / Sunni arab regime including most famously the bomb attack on Mustansiriya university and other terrorist attacks in 1980 prior to the war. Saddam went to war to get a grip on Iraq (he, like khomeini in Iran had only been in power for 1 year and was busy purging the military from Communists, shia-islamists and other "undesirables")... at no point in time did Iraq plan to actually occupy Iran beyond a "buffer zone" to protect Iraqi villages from Iranian artillery bombardment which was a regular occurrence against Iraqi villages in 1980 before the war as well as reclaim the other side of shatt al arab waterway that the Iraqis were forced to sign away in the 1975 treaty of algiers with the shah... but yes since your sources are all 100% Iranian you never "knew" about Iraqi perspectives and instead parrot outlandish propaganda (there's lots of outlandish propaganda from the Iraqi side if you're interested... but why bother with nonsense?)

Member for

12 years 5 months

Posts: 8,850

The Iraq supposedly had a good plan to win the war in the short term, however if was a good plan what had failed?
What exactly do you mean by "win"? According to you, exactly what objectives should have been met to declare "a victory"?

Member for

14 years

Posts: 516

Please give the source and the related link you claim for "However the version from Iranians the MiG 25 Foxbat in Al Shaibah.." for the benefit of all intrested ones. So all of those will have the opportunity to verify it by themselves.

As I did not know this before that the link was not allowed, so the link has been removed for violating the rules, but the link was about the book:

Bishop F and Cooper T, 2003, Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat.

How I have been labeled to advertise the Iranian version, and to demonstrate that this is not my purpose also suggest reading the book at the link indicated by sheytanelkebir:

Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, Elizabeth A. Nathan, Laila Sabara, Ana M. Venegas. SADDAM'S GENERALS
Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War

However the attack on Al Shai'bah Among the pages between 189 and 197 in the link were also commented on the counterattack from Iran with F 4 Phantom II on the afternoon of September 22 against Al-Shai'bah (Shoibah in other book) and Al Kut Iraq two hours after Iraq's had started the offensive against Iran.

In this interview with the former General the same denied that the Soviet Union had positioned aircraft in Iraq.

However what I have found out very interesting were the description on the page 195 from former Iraq General about Iraq had considered the possibility of using a Air Base from Oman to launch an attack with Tu 22 Blinders against Iran, which did not happen due to the fact the runway was too short for the Tu 22 Blinder take off with full load.

If Iraq did not receive or even request the support from others nations as the Soviet Union then why ask to launch an attack of Oman and maybe put this country in war with Iran?

I imagine in my pathetic mind if someone ask this to some authority from Oman in the better hypothesis if hi answer for it I guess the Oman authority would be denied this, even it were considered by Oman and requested by Iraq, and he would laugh about the absurdity of the idea of the Tu 22 Blinder from Iraq taking off from Oman to attack Iran during the war.

However with regard of theMiG 25RB/PDS from Soviet Union in Iraq, even though denied by Iraq and former Soviet Union( Russian today!), this could leads to some questions, since I do not know in details about the the introduction of the MiG 25 in Iraq, or better the training phase and selection of pilots for this aircraft's. In Syria the Introduction of the MiG 25RB/PDS were a slow process as long with all other countries, even in the Soviet Union, and in the war in Lebanon with Israel in 1981 there were few MiG 25 from Syria in operational status.

The central question would be why the Iraq War began the offensive on September 22, 1980 when the MiG 25RB/PDS were not operational despite had been ordered from Soviet Union in 1979 as following items: 12 Mil Mi 25 Hind, 10 II 76, 24 An 12, 48 Su-22M-3K, 104 MiG 23ML, 90 MiG 21 and MiG 24 25RB/PDS. Not to mention the 1000 SAM missiles (SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6).

If Iraq had been requesting the MiG 25PDS Foxbat since 1978 to face the F 14A Tomcat from Iran, why Iraq started the war before to receive the critical fighter Foxbat from Soviet Union?

MSphere
Originally Posted by maurobaggio
The Iraq supposedly had a good plan to win the war in the short term, however if was a good plan what had failed?

What exactly do you mean by "win"? According to you, exactly what objectives should have been met to declare "a victory"?

[RIGHT]"Ensure the conditions for victory before starting the battle"
General Sun Tzu - The Art of the War[[/RIGHT]

In another post I would try to answer your questions, but in the meantime why not consider about what actually failed in the Iraq plan to ensure the conditions for the enemy would not have the opportunity of reversing the tide of war ...

Member for

22 years 7 months

Posts: 11,742

The Bishop&Cooper book was written before the fall of Saddam in 2003.

The Oman option for the use of the Tu-22B was no more than an idea without second thoughts about the political consequences.
The claim about runway-length was a bad excuse. The demand of the Tu-22B was of ~2300 m runway length or similar to that of an ordinary Boeing 707 airliner f.e.

About the central question. Saddam was a politican and not a military person despite dressed in uniform sometimes.
- The border incidents
- The Iran hostage crisis and US embargo
- The power struggle in Iran
- Several officers from the Schah in prison
"Banisadr was elected to a four-year term as President on 25 January 1980, receiving 78.9 percent of the vote in the election, and was inaugurated on 4 February. Khomeini remained the Supreme Leader of Iran, with the constitutional authority to dismiss the President. The inaugural ceremonies were held at the hospital where Khomeini was recovering from a heart ailment.[2] Banisadr was not an Islamic cleric; Khomeini had insisted that clerics should not run for positions in the government. In August and September 1980, Banisadr survived two helicopter crashes near the Iranian border with Iraq. Banisadr soon fell out with Khomeini, who reclaimed the power of Commander-in-Chief on 10 June 1981."
All that in mind Saddam was convinced that a limited military push in favorable political conditions was enough to force his intrests on a weaken Iran. He never had the idea of eight years war with Iran ahead.

{In 1967 Israel was surprised at the start of a major reequipment program as well and did succeed. History does not wait for the well prepared one.}

In short Saddam had not the idea of a full scale war against the Iran in 1980.
"War Is Merely the Continuation of Policy by Other Means" may have been his military thinking only.

Member for

9 years 5 months

Posts: 783

maurobaggio have you managed to open up the other texts I sent you (the ones that download as GetTRDOC and you have to append a .pdf to it manually... problem with US military ebook download system!).

Member for

12 years 5 months

Posts: 8,850

If Iraq had been requesting the MiG 25PDS Foxbat since 1978 to face the F 14A Tomcat from Iran, why Iraq started the war before to receive the critical fighter Foxbat from Soviet Union?
Maybe the F-14As in IRIAF service were far less of an issue than we are led to think?

[RIGHT]"Ensure the conditions for victory before starting the battle"
General Sun Tzu - The Art of the War[[/RIGHT]
Sorry but that quote does not answer my question in any way.
What were Saddam's objectives in that war, in your opinion?

In another post I would try to answer your questions, but in the meantime why not consider about what actually failed in the Iraq plan to ensure the conditions for the enemy would not have the opportunity of reversing the tide of war ...
Sorry but how do you want to discuss that something has failed if you don't even know the goals?

Member for

14 years

Posts: 516

The Bishop&Cooper book was written before the fall of Saddam in 2003.

The Oman option for the use of the Tu-22B was no more than an idea without second thoughts about the political consequences.
The claim about runway-length was a bad excuse. The demand of the Tu-22B was of ~2300 m runway length or similar to that of an ordinary Boeing 707 airliner f.e.

Bishop F and Cooper T, 2003, Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat.

If the book is such wrong why nobody has been writing a right book since 2003 belying what was previously written?

Regarding the former Iraq General in the book he knows much more about the Tu 22 Blinder's apparently than all us , since in the Soviet Union Air Bases for the Tu 22 Blinder the standard concrete runway had 3,000 m( 10,000 ft) long and 80 m( 240 ft) wide, and in the summer with temperature of 25ºC and maximum load takeoff were a critical factor in the mission, since Tu 22 took off with less than 50 m( 150 ft) to the runway end.

So at a temperature between 40ºC to 50ºC during the day in Oman the Tu 22 Blinder was still "taxiing" at the end of a runway with 2,300 m (6,900 ft) length with full load of the 92,000 Kg (200,560 lb).

The military logic assumes that first should be obtain the political consent to then study the technical feasibility to accomplish a mission.

However I agree too that such idea should have been abandoned after a second thought, and this has happened because even Iraq Air Force or Oman would not be able to prevent the retaliation from Iran Air Force with fighter-bombers F-4 Phantoms II and interceptors F-14 Tomcats with air tankers B 707 and B 747 to support the operation against Oman.

Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, Elizabeth A. Nathan, Laila Sabara, Ana M. Venegas. SADDAM'S GENERALS
Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War.

About the central question. Saddam was a politican and not a military person despite dressed in uniform sometimes.
- The border incidents
- The Iran hostage crisis and US embargo
- The power struggle in Iran
- Several officers from the Schah in prison

In short Saddam had not the idea of a full scale war against the Iran in 1980.
"War Is Merely the Continuation of Policy by Other Means" may have been his military thinking only.

The facts had been mentioned collaborating for the Iraq offensive started on 22 September 1980, however the central question remains once the former Iraq General said that it were not foreseen in the attack plan against Iran any reaction from Iran Air Force in less than 48 hours after the start of the offensive by Iraq, though the counterattack from Iran on day 22 and the main counter-attack on 23 has demonstrated the failure in war planning from Iraq.

The central question would be why the Iraq War began the offensive on September 22, 1980 when the MiG 25RB/PDS were not operational despite had been ordered from Soviet Union in 1979 as following items: 12 Mil Mi 25 Hind, 10 II 76, 24 An 12, 48 Su-22M-3K, 104 MiG 23ML, 90 MiG 21 and MiG 24 25RB/PDS. Not to mention the 1000 SAM missiles (SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6).

1)If Iraq had been requesting the MiG 25PDS Foxbat since 1978 to face the F 14A Tomcat from Iran, why Iraq started the war before to receive the critical fighter Foxbat from Soviet Union?

"The victorious General first ensure the conditions for victory before starting the battle"

[RIGHT]General Sun Tzu - The Art of the War[/RIGHT]

Saddam was not military, however was surrounded by generals, and not all of them were Iraqis, so the failure was not due to lack of military knowledge of Saddam or his generals and advisers. However someone failed, since a war in eight years without winning side certainly would not be interest to both.

2)If this fails has been clear, so now the second question should be who failed?

Member for

11 years 10 months

Posts: 2,120

Delaying operations for equipment to become operational is not necessarily a good thing.

E.g. Hitler delayed Citadelle so Wehrmacht could receive Panther tanks. It did not work out well for the Germans as Soviets had time to prepare defences and rebuild units damaged in Mannheim's Backhand Blow and other operations.

In fact Germany did very well when it's main equipment was training tanks (Panzer I and II). Waiting for Panzer III and IV to come online in prescribed numbers would've just meant that the French and British had also rearmed.

You want to strike while the iron is hot - I think Saddam's timing was ok as Iran was in chaos. It was the execution that was the problem.

And much like Hitler, Saddam underestimated Iranian resolve.

Wars are not about superiority of equipment. They're more about strategic initiative, good strategy, good tactics, access to resources and logistics.

The most important thing about equipment is the personnel that use them and the logistics that sustain them (again T-34/Sherman v Panther/Tiger analogy is good here).

Therefore having MiG-25s operational even in 1979 would not have made a lick of difference. Delaying war to 1982 so MiG-25 would be in service would result in loss of strategic initiative as Iran would've reorganised by then.

Member for

14 years

Posts: 516

Delaying operations for equipment to become operational is not necessarily a good thing.

E.g. Hitler delayed Citadelle so Wehrmacht could receive Panther tanks. It did not work out well for the Germans as Soviets had time to prepare defences and rebuild units damaged in Mannheim's Backhand Blow and other operations.

You want to strike while the iron is hot - I think Saddam's timing was ok as Iran was in chaos. It was the execution that was the problem.

Wars are not about superiority of equipment. They're more about strategic initiative, good strategy, good tactics, access to resources and logistics.

Therefore having MiG-25s operational even in 1979 would not have made a lick of difference. Delaying war to 1982 so MiG-25 would be in service would result in loss of strategic initiative as Iran would've reorganised by then.

"If you know that our troops can attack, but do not know that the enemy can not be attacked, we are only halfway to victory. If you know the enemy can be attacked, but did not realize that our troops can not attack, we're halfway to victory. It is, therefore, that if you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not be put at risk. If you know the sky and know the land, your victory may be full."
[RIGHT]General Sun Tzu - The Art of the War.[/RIGHT]

It was a very good example and comparison performed, although my opinion does not mean anything.

Also agree with the analysis that the MiG 25 would not make a difference even on September 22, 1980, and if the information is true that these were already in Iraq would be further evidence that did not make the difference, Since the supposed Shai’bah AB from soviet MiG 25 Foxbat was attacked by F 4E Phantom II two hours after the start from Iraq offensive.

The reason would be that on September 23 against the Iran had attacked Iraq with a mass of the 200 aircraft, which is composed according to some sources 140 F-4D / E Phantom II and F 5E / F Tiger II fighter- bombers with 60 F 14A Tomcat interceptors as escort, with the support of tanks and aircraft command B 707 and B 747, in addition to EC 130 Hercules aircraft from Electronic Warfare.

Even if the MiG 21 and MiG 23 were able to evade the Iranians missiles BVR( Beyond Visual Range) AIM 7E Sparrow and AIM 54A Phoenix , and still had been suffering interference on their radars and communication were able to locate and get in close combat with the Iranians, but yet the Iraq fighters would be at a disadvantage since the Iranians fighters were equipped with infra red short range missiles AIM 9P Sidewinder which was far superior to the short-range missile at the disposition of Iraq in 1980.

In 1980, the Israel Air Force could only dream about a task force comprised by its aircraft’s from Iran, thus put Iraq faced this deadly apparatus alone, and resisted it, so it was still able to invade Iran with several Iraq Army Divisions in few day after that counterattack.

Although surprised by the massive counterattack from Iran which selected strategic targets, Iraq had maintained the initial plan of invasion, since the conclusion was that Iran could not maintain that intensity rate from air operations for long , and thus the Iraq Army should reach their goals without suffering major losses from Iran Air Force and the Iranian Army Aviation (attack helicopters AH 1J Cobra ).

The Iraq was wrong about the military capabilities from Iran before the war as they did not expect any air counterattack from Iran against Iraq in less than 48 hours, which could mean that this 48 hrs the Iran Air Force should have been decapitated for the whole structure (Radar Warning System, Fuel Depots, Maintenance Shops, i.e.) even if the aircraft were not destroyed in their HAS( Hardened Aircraft Shelter) and the runways from Air Bases were repaired the Iran Air Force would be unable to resist for more than weeks with limited capabilities.

Despite that was mentioned above the Iraq decision to launch a major ground offensive without establishing air superiority was almost a disaster, since all territorial gains were lost, and it did not take too long to Iraq who was defending its borders.

Assign blame for these errors in 1980 for Saddam could be the same to assign blame for the failure of the operation Citadele for Hitler in 1943, both of which had no great military experience, despite in the First World War the Hitler had better military experience than Saddam once Hitler was corporal with messenger function.

However in the case from Operation Citadele in 1943 should be important to mention too that was the British Secret Service that had informed the Soviet Union High Command from the beginning of the Phase Planning from Operation Citadele.

The British Secret Service had already deciphered in 1943 the German codes from Germans crypto communications system ENIGMA , and the Germans did not know this and used them to send the preparation instructions to all units that would participate in the operation and telling all details from this as the dates that the preparations should be finalized.

In fact Hitler should have listened to his stomach, since whenever he thought previous about the feasibility from Operation Citadele his stomach ached.

Member for

9 years 5 months

Posts: 783

maurobaggio.

why don't you join the ACIG forum and ask cooper/bishop directly there instead of regurgitating the obsolete writings from cooper/bishop from before 2010 (when Iraqi info started to come out). Since talking to you here is like banging my head against a brick wall... you seem to be completely averse to reading any details written post 2010 by the US military from captured official Iraqi top secret documents... whilst the iranian "perspective" written by cooper/bishop is in fact not backed by official data at all...

Member for

9 years 5 months

Posts: 783

Bishop F and Cooper T, 2003, Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat.

If the book is such wrong why nobody has been writing a right book since 2003 belying what was previously written?

There are such books, I sent you links to them. There are plenty more in Arabic.

Regarding the former Iraq General in the book he knows much more about the Tu 22 Blinder's apparently than all us , since in the Soviet Union Air Bases for the Tu 22 Blinder the standard concrete runway had 3,000 m( 10,000 ft) long and 80 m( 240 ft) wide, and in the summer with temperature of 25ºC and maximum load takeoff were a critical factor in the mission, since Tu 22 took off with less than 50 m( 150 ft) to the runway end.

So at a temperature between 40ºC to 50ºC during the day in Oman the Tu 22 Blinder was still "taxiing" at the end of a runway with 2,300 m (6,900 ft) length with full load of the 92,000 Kg (200,560 lb).

The military logic assumes that first should be obtain the political consent to then study the technical feasibility to accomplish a mission.

However I agree too that such idea should have been abandoned after a second thought, and this has happened because even Iraq Air Force or Oman would not be able to prevent the retaliation from Iran Air Force with fighter-bombers F-4 Phantoms II and interceptors F-14 Tomcats with air tankers B 707 and B 747 to support the operation against Oman.

Oman was neutral in the war. What the general mentioned is simply one "idea" discussed by officers in a conversation! not even something the Iraqis planned or made any requests from Oman... just a CHAT THEY HAD OVER TEA!!!!! PS... I would expect the Iranian air force to have about the same capability of destroying the TU22 in Oman as they did to the TU22s in Iraq... i.e. none.

Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, Elizabeth A. Nathan, Laila Sabara, Ana M. Venegas. SADDAM'S GENERALS
Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War.

The facts had been mentioned collaborating for the Iraq offensive started on 22 September 1980, however the central question remains once the former Iraq General said that it were not foreseen in the attack plan against Iran any reaction from Iran Air Force in less than 48 hours after the start of the offensive by Iraq, though the counterattack from Iran on day 22 and the main counter-attack on 23 has demonstrated the failure in war planning from Iraq.

no. you are completely and utterly wrong. Iraqis neither said nor expected such a thing, already in august Iranian fighters were shooting at Iraqi aircraft near the border (shooting down a MiG21) and Iraqis shot down Iranian fighters in Early september which was bombing Iraq on the 8th September... the pilot of that Phantom was held by Iraq until 2003 as proof that Iran started the war against Iraqi in 8th September 1980, and the 22nd september was Iraq's counterattack.

PS. Iraq's attack was 98% on the ground. The "air war" was neither here nor there.

The central question would be why the Iraq War began the offensive on September 22, 1980 when the MiG 25RB/PDS were not operational despite had been ordered from Soviet Union in 1979 as following items: 12 Mil Mi 25 Hind, 10 II 76, 24 An 12, 48 Su-22M-3K, 104 MiG 23ML, 90 MiG 21 and MiG 24 25RB/PDS. Not to mention the 1000 SAM missiles (SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6).

1)If Iraq had been requesting the MiG 25PDS Foxbat since 1978 to face the F 14A Tomcat from Iran, why Iraq started the war before to receive the critical fighter Foxbat from Soviet Union?

"The victorious General first ensure the conditions for victory before starting the battle"

[RIGHT]General Sun Tzu - The Art of the War[/RIGHT]

Saddam was not military, however was surrounded by generals, and not all of them were Iraqis, so the failure was not due to lack of military knowledge of Saddam or his generals and advisers. However someone failed, since a war in eight years without winning side certainly would not be interest to both.

2)If this fails has been clear, so now the second question should be who failed?

You failed to read any books other than cooper/bishop.

hint. 99% of the "Iran Iraq war" was ON THE GROUND. neither the Iraqi nor Iranian air force made any decisive difference.

Member for

14 years

Posts: 516

maurobaggio.

why don't you join the ACIG forum and ask cooper/bishop directly there instead of regurgitating the obsolete writings from cooper/bishop from before 2010 (when Iraqi info started to come out). Since talking to you here is like banging my head against a brick wall... you seem to be completely averse to reading any details written post 2010 by the US military from captured official Iraqi top secret documents... whilst the iranian "perspective" written by cooper/bishop is in fact not backed by official data at all...

That's cool ! I did not know that had forum there. But I do not think it would be such funny as being here, however if you're there I'll think fondly on the invitation.:cool:

But while they has been tolerating each us here , once to keep this space free for debate costs money, and much more in an epoch of the international crisis, I suppose it would be more constructive to the discussion ideas and opinions as this way the knowledge could be obtained , even when we believe passionately in something that could be right it doesn't means that would remains right after the same were exposed to debate , at least in a democratic space its is allow just like here.:sleeping:

Unfortunately I do not know Arabic as well as many other languages as include my native language, but I think as you have fluency in English and Arabic would be very interesting to bring their opinions and the sources that you used to formulate their concepts if they can be released without affecting the copyright and security from the sources.

As I recall this thread is about the MiG 25 Vs F 4 Phantom in the Iran / Iraq War, and how MSphere has made me a tricky question to answer without perhaps provoke strong emotions, and how my opinion is no better than anyone, the fact may be worse than many, I ask for someone else:

What the practical purpose of the invasion of the Iran by Iraq in 1980, and how Iraq had intended to remain the same, after all who invades a country does not do to leave it so soon as remain in war indefinitely with MiG 25 Vs F 4 Phantom?:confused:

"After evaluating the advantages according to what you hear, go to action, completing the strategic power with tactical field that respond to external factors. The strategic power, in turn, is the tactical control of the imbalance of power according to the gains to be obtained."
[RIGHT]General Sun Tzu - The Art of the War.[/RIGHT]

Member for

22 years 7 months

Posts: 11,742

Bishop F and Cooper T, 2003, Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat.

If the book is such wrong why nobody has been writing a right book since 2003 belying what was previously written?

Regarding the former Iraq General in the book he knows much more about the Tu 22 Blinder's apparently than all us , since in the Soviet Union Air Bases for the Tu 22 Blinder the standard concrete runway had 3,000 m( 10,000 ft) long and 80 m( 240 ft) wide, and in the summer with temperature of 25ºC and maximum load takeoff were a critical factor in the mission, since Tu 22 took off with less than 50 m( 150 ft) to the runway end.

So at a temperature between 40ºC to 50ºC during the day in Oman the Tu 22 Blinder was still "taxiing" at the end of a runway with 2,300 m (6,900 ft) length with full load of the 92,000 Kg (200,560 lb).

The military logic assumes that first should be obtain the political consent to then study the technical feasibility to accomplish a mission.

However I agree too that such idea should have been abandoned after a second thought, and this has happened because even Iraq Air Force or Oman would not be able to prevent the retaliation from Iran Air Force with fighter-bombers F-4 Phantoms II and interceptors F-14 Tomcats with air tankers B 707 and B 747 to support the operation against Oman.

Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, Elizabeth A. Nathan, Laila Sabara, Ana M. Venegas. SADDAM'S GENERALS
Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War.

The facts had been mentioned collaborating for the Iraq offensive started on 22 September 1980, however the central question remains once the former Iraq General said that it were not foreseen in the attack plan against Iran any reaction from Iran Air Force in less than 48 hours after the start of the offensive by Iraq, though the counterattack from Iran on day 22 and the main counter-attack on 23 has demonstrated the failure in war planning from Iraq.

It is expensive to produce a book and you have to earn the related money by selling it. Bishop and Cooper were the first ones to claim a view from the Iranian side.
At the time of publishing the F-14 was still in USN service and Saddam in power. Best circumstances for such a kind of book showing superior US-weapons against inferior Russian ones.

Looking into the details about the Tu-22B. It had a radius of action of ~1100 km.
The distance from Habanniya to Bandar Abbas is over 1500 km staying over the Persian Gulf most of the time.
From Basra the distance is over 1100 km or at the limit of the T-22B and not much allowances left for out of standard day conditions.
None denies the heat stress in Oman. But Seeb Int. AP has a runway of over 3,5 km and a steady land-sea-wind system supporting the take-off run. Non is forced to start a mission in peak hit after noon. Distance to Bandar Abbas 450 km.
Fujairah AP has a runway of over 3,7 km and similar conditions. Distance to Bandar Abbas 230 km.

To operate from Oman against Bandar Abbas you are not in need of a Tu-22B at all.

The idea was to start the attack from Iraq with max weapons-load and have stop in Oman to refuel there for the return leg. I have no idea, if it was planned for a night attack or in daytime. Such a stop-over had not lasted more than one hour and the Iranians had no time left to find out that in time if at all. For the return-leg from Oman the Tu-22B without weapon-load was neither in need of max internal fuel nor close to MTOW by that with a healthy safety-margin. No problem for the Tu-22B at such lower weight at peak heat and minimum wind the worst conditions in mind. Such a round-trip or mission had not lasted well over 5 hours in total.
In short a technical excuse to explain the own public the denial of Oman. The Oman was not willing to take any risc for the Iraq at all. A proud Arab is looking for face keeping explanation whenever possible.