Western Air Force bright spot - RAAF and Australian Army

By: Riaino - 19th September 2013 at 09:17 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00

Since we have usually only maintained 2 active tank squadrons in 1st Armoured Regiment having 120 and 90 gun tanks was wasteful and 59 M1s is merely acceptance of this 55 year old fact. So despite owning 120 Centurions were only rotated 58 through Vietnam to keep 26 on strength with 1ATF. This is almost exactly how many M1s we own, what a coincidence!

As for willingness to deploy them in warzones, the government bought them reason, and when the situation arises where tanks are needed they will be sent. Such a situation hasn't arisen since 1971, but then again we had F111s for 37 years and they never dropped a bomb in anger.

By: Pioneer - 20th September 2013 at 04:00 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00

[QUOTE=thobbes;2067360]F-111 was brought as a deterrent against Sukarno's Indonesia (late delivery meant they were never used in this role).

But F-111 was a superb choice for Australia as it was a long range strike aircraft.

I agree. It's only a sad case that we (the ADF) did not learn much out of this experiance :(
We purchased a promising weapons system of the drawing board, before it was proven, let alone tested! We paid over 10-years loss of combat capability, rediculous amounts of tax payers money and was relucant to upgrade and make the F-111 what it should have been, until near the end of its life with the RAAF. Add to this the 'hot and cold' attitude of our politician's negated much of the F-111's true potential (i.e. political fear and spine to support the Pig with 'boom' equipped air refuelling) Does this mistake sound common with ADF aquasition ...... Ammm F-35!!

In an ideal world, I think an ideal Australian fleet would be 72 F-35 + 24-36 FB-22. Alas FB-22 is gone.

For what we have paid and what we are yet to pay + loss of operational capability we should have simply purchased 50 x FB-22's!! (in my opinion)
This crap about the U.S not wanting us to buy F-22's was because of their realisation that the F-35 program was in trouble. It needed everyones commitment to show Congress caurse not to can the whole F-35 program (as it should have been!)

As stated I'd rather spend the money assigned for token tank force on more F-35s or CH-47s or patrol boats or frigates or whatever.[/

Oh don't get me started on these stupid Patrol Boats!! What a pathetic political and naval joke the purchase of these were!! The Navy knew better than anyone else that what was needed was and is corvetts-sized and ocean-going capable vessels. Yes we need inshore patrol boat (as we need inshoe MCMV's). 'What do you get when you send a 'patrol boat' out into the Pacific Ocean again and again to stop scary assylam seekers/refugees? Answer - ineffective capability and cracked hulls!!

Yeah I'm all for more Chinooks - great and effective birds!!

Regards
Pioneer

By: Riaino - 20th September 2013 at 07:42 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00

As stated I'd rather spend the money assigned for token tank force on more F-35s or CH-47s or patrol boats or frigates or whatever.

The Capability Development Group decided that the money should be spent on a tank force, and they have access to all the relevant information.

By: Rii - 29th April 2014 at 00:57 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00

Repost from F-35 thread:

Professor Hugh White writes about the funding challenges facing the Australian military in the wake of the F-35 announcement. He strikes a measured tone which somewhat masks the extent of the problem. A more tabloid-esque title could well have run: "Did Tony Abbott and F-35 just doom Australia's next-gen submarine plans?"

The Age - Reconciling Australia's Warfare Shopping List With Reality

It's safe to say that plans for platforms such as Triton will vanish into the ether, to say nothing of Scooter-esque fantasies of F-35Bs for the Canberra-class LHDs. But as the least-formed and biggest-ticket (and arguably most important) item around it's undoubtedly the next-gen submarine program that will feel the brunt of the oncoming crunch. Forget about expanding to 12 units, we'll be lucky to replace the Collins-class boats 1:1.

Of course governments with more foresight and courage over the previous decade would've made choices like not acquiring fripperies like C-17s, Abrams, LHDs, etc. in the first place, and probably not have approved a dedicated AWD design either. Nor, needless to say, would they have pissed away billions in Afghanistan or Iraq. Rather they would've invested in replacing Australia's air combat capability with a single type (not F-35) at a much earlier date. Alas, the military's reach has outstretched its grasp yet again, and its unrealistic ambitions have either been enabled (Howard) or gone unchecked (Rudd and Gillard) by successive governments, and it is truly necessary capabilities such as Australia's submarine fleet that will suffer the long-term costs of such foolishness. But the Americans are happy with us, and that's what really matters.... right?

To bring things back to the subject of the thread: the delays in the F-35, coupled with Australia's ridiculously premature commitment to that program, and irresponsible funding decisions in the interim, have combined to ensure that the full costs of Australia's air combat replacement program will be eating all available funds alive through the 2020s and crippling future investment programs, most significantly for the Collins-class replacement.

By: bring_it_on - 29th April 2014 at 00:59 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00

What are they looking at for a sub replacement program?

By: Rii - 29th April 2014 at 01:09 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00

And now for the reason I reactivated this thread: Former Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser is about to release a book, Dangerous Allies, that should be of interest to folks here.

In Dangerous Allies, Malcolm Fraser argues that the greatest security threat facing Australia today derives from its unhealthy relationship with the United States. Excerpts from his plug-piece for The Age:

My latest book Dangerous Allies focuses on Australia’s strategic dependence – first on the United Kingdom, and then on the United States. It tells the story of sometimes enormous sacrifice and loss of life, and of fighting wars that were not always in Australia’s direct interest.

The need for dependence on a major power lies deep in Australia's psyche. It is in our DNA.

Since 1991, we have become more closely entwined and committed to US policy than ever before.An Australian, Major General Burr, is second in charge of 60,000 US troops in the western Pacific. We have a frigate periodically acting as one of the escorts to USS Washington stationed in Japan. We have US marines in Darwin. That military force is turning step by step into a hard hitting, aggressive one, capable of exercising power anywhere throughout the region. With the development of new weapons technologies, the purpose for which joint Australia-US defense facility Pine Gap is used has been subtly and dangerously altered. It is now integral to the targeting of a variety of weapons systems, including drone killings, even of Australians in Yemen.

The next chapter is starting to unfold. The US has embraced a policy of containment of China. Military relationships from Japan all the way south through the Philippines, Singapore and Australia are being strengthened.

Hugh White has said, and I agree with him, that a clash between China and Japan, who are not really talking to each other, is highly possible. While technically the US remains neutral over disputed islands in the East China Sea, they have de facto sided with Japan.

If the US is involved with a war with China as the result of Japanese provocation, Australia, on current policy settings, would inevitably be involved. Our national interest would require us to stay out of such a war, but the marines in Darwin and the current use of Pine Gap would make it impossible for us to stay neutral. We would not be believed, because we are hosting an aggressive military force which is integral to the firing of a variety of weapons systems.

In distant days, if Britain went to war, we also were at war. We have now tragically put ourselves in the same position with the US, in circumstances far more serious for our future.

That is the decision Australia faces today. Some commentators have argued that Australia has to choose between the US and China, which is nonsense. I want Australia to be strategically independent, to have the capacity to make our own decisions, to not to be bound by US decisions and not be allied with the US or with China.

This book is remarkable for two reasons: first, it is the rare articulation of the thesis, from an establishment figure -- a former right-wing Prime Minister no less -- that Australia's relationship with the United States is unhealthy and potentially catastrophic for the nation.

The book is remarkable also because it necessarily involves an unusual degree of self-criticism. As Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser was involved in sending young Australians to die in Vietnam, a war he now believes was a mistake to have been fought at all, and which in any case Australia should never have gotten involved in.

I look forward to reading it. I wonder if he has anything to say about 'Junior Sheriff' Howard and Australia's commitment to the F-35 program...

By: Rii - 29th April 2014 at 01:39 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00

What are they looking at for a sub replacement program?

There are currently six Collins-class boats of dubious readiness; recent Defence White Papers (QDR seems to be the closest American equivalent) have advocated an expansion of the submarine fleet to twelve units. In terms of operating characteristics, it is desired that the new submarines be even larger than the Collins-class boats so as to be suitable for long-range deployments and carriage of special forces units, etc. At one point (the era of maximum fantasy) nuclear propulsion was even considered. More recent discussion has focused on cooperation with Japan (see: Soryu-class) which has similar requirements for its SSKs.

By: bring_it_on - 29th April 2014 at 01:42 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00

There are currently six Collins-class boats of dubious readiness; recent Defence White Papers (QDR seems to be the closest American equivalent) have advocated a future expansion of the submarine fleet to twelve units. In terms of operating characteristics, it is desired that they be even larger than the Collins-class boats so as to be suitable for long-range deployments and carriage of special forces units, etc. At one point (the era of maximum fantasy) nuclear propulsion was even considered. More recent discussion has focused on cooperation with Japan (see: Soryu-class) which has similar requirements for its SSKs.

Thanks, any idea on timelines and what the projected cost of the replacement program is to be..