Israel's Arrow Successful
In Multi-Launch Demo
DAVID A. FULGHUM/WASHINGTON
The Israel Defense Force demonstrated that its Arrow ballistic-missile-defense system can acquire several targets at once, prioritize them and launch at least four interceptor missiles almost simultaneously to knock them down.
Israel launched an Arrow and three surrogates against four computer-generated targets to prove the system can defend against several incoming warheads.
On the afternoon of Jan. 5, the Green Pine radar controlling the Arrow battery at Palmachim AB, south of Tel Aviv, was fed four computer-
generated targets simulating missiles--fired in a special low trajectory from a nearby country in the region. The Elta-built fire-control radar acquired the targets, the Tadiran Systems battle management control center calculated the path of the targets and then sent a mission command to the IAI/MLM launcher control system. The launcher was equipped with six interceptors. In this test, one fully functioning Arrow and three "short burning-time-motor" interceptors were fired to validate the multi-launch process, said a defense official.
The time between launch of the first missile and the first interception was around 1 min., with all four missiles being fired within seconds of each other "almost simultaneously," said an IAI official.
Officials launched four of six available missiles. Two can be seen in the air and the door of the third launch chamber is open.
Israel Aircraft Industries and Israeli Missile Defense Organization researchers, including IAI's Arrow program director, Boaz Levy, will be in Washington this week to brief officials at the U.S. Missile Defense Agency on the test results. This test was one of several in the initial phase of the Arrow System Improvement Program, Levy said. It was the "first of a series of tests intended to evaluate the system's performance against the next generation of incoming threats," the IDF official said.
IAI OFFICIALS were vague about when the 11th Arrow test would be scheduled. This test had originally been slated for October-November, and deferred toJanuary. Researchers said they expect to continue testing at the rate of about one firing per year. However, there are plans for additional Arrow tests in the U.S. against actual Scud missiles and Scud surrogates. A 50-person Israeli team working at Vandenberg AFB, Calif., observed Scud launches last month, and a U.S. team was in Israel to observe last week's Arrow test.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
China Adds Science
Ops to Manned Effort
CRAIG COVAULT/CAPE CANAVERAL
China has begun to integrate substantial science operations into its Shenzhou manned space flight development effort much earlier than did the Soviet Union and U.S. at the start of their manned programs in the 1960s.
The 7,000-lb. reentry module of China's Shenzhou 4 development vehicle returned to Earth safely Jan. 5, while the spacecraft's 3,500-lb. orbital module remains in orbit transmitting Earth resources microwave sounder data.
The launch and recovery of the unmanned Shenzhou 4 vehicle clears the way for China's first manned space flight, now expected to be launched during the second half of this year ( AW&ST Jan. 6, p. 17).
Shenzhou carried 52 science payloads weighing more than 600 lb. And pictures of the orbital module before launch showed a multi-box experiment package and dish antennas associated with the microwave system mounted on its nose. Although the People's Liberation Army runs the secretive Chinese manned program, the early inclusion of relatively complex science operations and affiliated research institutes could provide a focal point for international cooperation once manned flights begin.
More than 30 of the science payloads on Shenzhou 4 were flown for the first time, while nearly two dozen other science payloads had also flown on the three previous Shenzhou missions since 1999.
The multimode microwave sensor is the most complex of the payloads. Since it is positioned on the orbital module still aloft, it is expected to return data on land, sea and atmospheric phenomena for several months. Several space-environment-monitoring sensors are also mounted on the orbital module.
Other zero-g experiments were mounted in the descent module and are undergoing laboratory analysis following their return to Earth. These included fluid physics, materials processing and biotechnology studies. One complex experiment under development for 10 years by the Shanghai Institute for Biological Sciences fused living cells using electrical fields.
The Shenzhou program is China's single largest aerospace effort involving thousands of engineers, dozens of factories and design centers and new command, control and training facilities, most of them under the PLA ( AW&ST Nov. 12, 2001, p. 52). Secretive for years about its 14-man astronaut corps, China last week began to reveal more about the group, showing crewmen undergoing pressure-suit training and parabolic aircraft flights generating 30 sec. of zero-g at a time.
The 9-ton Shenzhou 4 was launched Dec. 30 on board a Long March 2F from Jiuquan in the Gobi Desert. The spacecraft was placed into an initial 124 X 213-mi. orbit. During its fifth revolution, Shenzhou was commanded to fire its engines to circularize the orbit at 213 mi. at an inclination of 42.4 deg. During nearly seven days aloft, the spacecraft performed at least three additional maneuvers.
Commands to the vehicle were issued by flight controllers at the new Beijing Aerospace Command and Control Center. The messages were routed to China's tracking network headquarters in Xian for transmission to Shenzhou from Chinese ground stations and four "Long View" space tracking ships positioned in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans.
Chinese state television views taken inside the new Beijing center during the flight showed multiple display screens with Shenzhou data, including a large center screen providing real-time views of the spacecraft's instrument panel and occasional views of Earth outside the windows. The Shenzhou instrument panel has 4-5 computer display screens. Two instrumented mannequins in spacesuits were on board the vehicle to record temperature, airflow and other parameters.
DURING SHENZHOU'S 107th orbit, the Long View-3 ship positioned in the South Atlantic was used to transmit deorbit commands to the spacecraft. The 11-ft.-long pressurized instrument module was first separated from the descent module so it would remain in orbit. Then engines on the 8,000-lb. aft service module were fired to begin the descent.
The aft module was then separated and burned up in the atmosphere, while the descent vehicle flew a ballistic reentry to a precisely targeted landing at 1116 GMT 20 mi. from Hohhot, Inner Mongolia. Recovery forces using a mobile telemetry facility and five search helicopters were forced to endure temperatures down to-30C.
The three previous unmanned Shenzhou missions were flown in late 1999 and early 2001 and 2002. Of those, the second flight worked well in orbit, but had an apparent malfunction on landing that could have injured or killed any crewmen on board.
Indications are that a parachute problem was involved in the Shenzhou 2 landing incident. And prior to the launch of Shenzhou 4, the Chinese aired meticulous detail about extra testing they had done on the Shenzhou's descent system, which includes a 1,200-sq.-meter main chute and a 760-sq.-meter backup chute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
F/A-22 Production Rate
Sliced in Budget Move
DAVID A. FULGHUM/WASHINGTON
U.S. Air Force and Lockheed Martin officials are trying to understand and adjust to the Pentagon's $876-million restructuring of the F/A-22 program that at first blush would reduce total production by as many as 63 aircraft--to as few as 276 from the original 339 stealthy fighters requested by the service.
TED CARLSON
USAF may be able to afford only around 300 F/A-22s under the current cost cap, not the 339 wanted, but they say the number may grow as production becomes cheaper.
Despite the fact that the 276 total was generated by the Air Force, it is artificially low, say Air Force officials with insight into the F/A-22 program. It's based on the cost of a fighter contracted for in 2003. The price is expected to decrease substantially as more are built and early research and development investments are amortized over a larger fleet. They predict that the actual number of aircraft built under the existing $43-billion price cap for the program will rise to 295 or more as production efficiency improves.
The reduction in numbers is driven by several interrelated developments. The cut in Fiscal 2003 is largely the result of Air Force and contractor cost-reduction efforts not bearing fruit to the extent hoped. The Fiscal 2004 reduction is intended to free up funds in the procurement program to offset shortfalls resulting from extension of the development phase. Both issues have led to fewer production aircraft, which in turn means the F/A-22 manufacturing effort isn't benefiting from production lessons as quickly as expected and therefore costs aren't coming down fast enough. Although the new program plan drives up the notionally average unit cost of the aircraft, program officials see a silver lining. The Defense Dept. estimates are so conservative that it should be easy for the Air Force to surpass demand, thereby boosting production numbers and putting an end to the spiral of bad news for the program that resulted from setting overly aggressive goals, a program representative said.
"We believe that range is achievable and that is our goal," said an Air Force official close to the program. "We believe, with stability in this program [possibly through C-17-type multi-year contracts], and if we can reestablish confidence in the supplier base, that we can significantly reduce the cost of these airplanes. We're making investment to do that. We hope to see the benefits of that as early as next year."
Others question the focus on total numbers. They contend the real threat to the F/A-22 program is the slowdown in production. The faster Lockheed Martin can climb to the most efficient production rate of 38 aircraft per year, the sooner greater savings will result.
"That will make it cheaper for however many you buy," a senior Air Force official said. "If you don't get to 38, production isn't efficient for the amount of tooling you bought." The new acquisition schedule slides peak production back three years to 2010 from 2007. The actual cut in production numbers will likely not be known with any certitude for years--until the cost of the aircraft stabilizes.
AN INDUSTRY ANALYST said, "It appears that the PBD says the Air Force is still authorized to build 333 [plus six engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) aircraft] if they can make the numbers work. The new plan does 'shallow out' the ramp-up rate to full production through 2009. The Air Force total is not overturned." Nonetheless, Air Force officials believe that the actual number of aircraft bought is likely to be nearer 300 than 339.
The new number in the program budget decision approved by Pentagon comptroller Dov Zakheim roughly splits the difference of the estimated $690-million-$1-billion cost overrun in EMD, estimated by the Air Force in November. In addition to $763 million shifted from the F/A-22 procurement account to R&D, Zakheim moved $113 million in Fiscal 2003 from the stealthy aircraft's operational system development account.
Changes in dollars and airframes projected through Fiscal 2009 by Pentagon acquisition officials include:
$106-million reduction in 2003 with the production rate dropping from 23 aircraft to 20.
$371 million in 2004, from 27 aircraft to 22.
$210 million in 2005, from 32 aircraft to 24.
$76 million in 2006, reducing from 36 to 26.
Reduction from 38 to 31 in 2007.
Reduction from 38 to 32 in 2008.
Reduction from 38 to 34 in 2009.
Production rates for 2010 and 2011 were planned at 38 and are not thought to have changed.
A statement from the Air Force says the service remains committed to a buy-to-budget strategy approved at the August 2001 Defense Acquisition Board for low-rate initial production, and will continue to pursue options for acquiring a minimum of 339 aircraft. Service officials said they stand behind conclusions of a study generated by Defense Planning Guidance. It recommended a "fleet of at least 381 F/A-22s as a balance between operational needs and risks in a fiscally constrained environment." Air Force planners concede in a written statement that funding EMD cost growth within existing program funds, as they intend to do, "could result in a small reduction in total quantity."
Both the Pentagon and Air Force totals are far less than the 381 aircraft requirement needed to equip 10 Air Expeditionary Forces and compensate for attrition reserve and training that was the service's goal. Currently the cost of each aircraft is approximately $189 million, but analysts worry that any reduction could be the start of the traditional spiral in which numbers go down--thereby driving costs up--which, in turn, leads to more cuts to meet the production cap.
"We could be starting down that slippery slope that killed B-2 production," said a senior Air Force official who is an F/A-22 advocate. "It could turn into a graveyard spiral, and one more hiccup in cost could change it from a force structure aircraft to a silver bullet. Reductions make the early aircraft very expensive. But the program is recoverable if it stays smooth through production."
Others warned about predicating programs on estimated costs.
"We make a big mistake when we use the average unit price of an aircraft to make a decision because we never know how many will ultimately be bought," said a recently retired Air Force program manager. "During the last year of the [President Jimmy] Carter administration Canada and Australia wanted to buy the F-15, but nobody could give them a price because it was supposed to be in the last year of production. So they bought the F/A-18 instead and the F-15 is still in production. So how many F/A-22s will we buy? It will be different from any number that's on the boards today."
Some senior Air Force planners and Defense Dept. civilians have suggested that additional F/A-22 requirements could be fulfilled by other types of aircraft and capabilities. The idea of dissimilar competition late in an aircraft's production cycle is to ensure cost pressure is maintained on the contractor. Senior defense civilians initially proposed pitting the F/A-18E/F against the Joint Strike Fighter for dissimilar competition, only now Air Force planners worry that both the F-35 and unmanned combat air vehicle could become competition for the F/A-22.
With juggling the F/A-22 program, speculation has increased about the effect of new draft 5000-series acquisition rules that have been in circulation in recent weeks.
"THERE ARE NO MORE RULES, just a lot of referees," said a recently retired Air Force program manager. Military program managers feel they are micromanaged by the Pentagon's senior civilians but then are always assigned blame when a program goes over budget and schedule. "The 5000 series are still there as a guide. But we won't really know what the new rules are until after the first few DABs [defense acquisition boards] have been run. Little by little, the important rules will be put back in place. From what I've read, there's not much difference. Spiral acquisition has been around a long time. It's like block development. It's planning in stages.
"The annual budgeting process is extremely deleterious to program stability and we tend to blame Congress. But the Air Force actually did a study of three years of rephasing of the F/A-22 program and discovered that they had made the most cuts and Congress made the fewest. The major wounds were self-inflicted. But with all its problems the acquisition team's products--like Joint Stars, JDAM, C-17--work magnificently."
Posts: 2,713
By: google - 14th January 2003 at 17:52
Israel's Arrow Successful
In Multi-Launch Demo
DAVID A. FULGHUM/WASHINGTON
The Israel Defense Force demonstrated that its Arrow ballistic-missile-defense system can acquire several targets at once, prioritize them and launch at least four interceptor missiles almost simultaneously to knock them down.
Israel launched an Arrow and three surrogates against four computer-generated targets to prove the system can defend against several incoming warheads.
On the afternoon of Jan. 5, the Green Pine radar controlling the Arrow battery at Palmachim AB, south of Tel Aviv, was fed four computer-
generated targets simulating missiles--fired in a special low trajectory from a nearby country in the region. The Elta-built fire-control radar acquired the targets, the Tadiran Systems battle management control center calculated the path of the targets and then sent a mission command to the IAI/MLM launcher control system. The launcher was equipped with six interceptors. In this test, one fully functioning Arrow and three "short burning-time-motor" interceptors were fired to validate the multi-launch process, said a defense official.
The time between launch of the first missile and the first interception was around 1 min., with all four missiles being fired within seconds of each other "almost simultaneously," said an IAI official.
Officials launched four of six available missiles. Two can be seen in the air and the door of the third launch chamber is open.
Israel Aircraft Industries and Israeli Missile Defense Organization researchers, including IAI's Arrow program director, Boaz Levy, will be in Washington this week to brief officials at the U.S. Missile Defense Agency on the test results. This test was one of several in the initial phase of the Arrow System Improvement Program, Levy said. It was the "first of a series of tests intended to evaluate the system's performance against the next generation of incoming threats," the IDF official said.
IAI OFFICIALS were vague about when the 11th Arrow test would be scheduled. This test had originally been slated for October-November, and deferred toJanuary. Researchers said they expect to continue testing at the rate of about one firing per year. However, there are plans for additional Arrow tests in the U.S. against actual Scud missiles and Scud surrogates. A 50-person Israeli team working at Vandenberg AFB, Calif., observed Scud launches last month, and a U.S. team was in Israel to observe last week's Arrow test.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
China Adds Science
Ops to Manned Effort
CRAIG COVAULT/CAPE CANAVERAL
China has begun to integrate substantial science operations into its Shenzhou manned space flight development effort much earlier than did the Soviet Union and U.S. at the start of their manned programs in the 1960s.
The 7,000-lb. reentry module of China's Shenzhou 4 development vehicle returned to Earth safely Jan. 5, while the spacecraft's 3,500-lb. orbital module remains in orbit transmitting Earth resources microwave sounder data.
The launch and recovery of the unmanned Shenzhou 4 vehicle clears the way for China's first manned space flight, now expected to be launched during the second half of this year ( AW&ST Jan. 6, p. 17).
Shenzhou carried 52 science payloads weighing more than 600 lb. And pictures of the orbital module before launch showed a multi-box experiment package and dish antennas associated with the microwave system mounted on its nose. Although the People's Liberation Army runs the secretive Chinese manned program, the early inclusion of relatively complex science operations and affiliated research institutes could provide a focal point for international cooperation once manned flights begin.
More than 30 of the science payloads on Shenzhou 4 were flown for the first time, while nearly two dozen other science payloads had also flown on the three previous Shenzhou missions since 1999.
The multimode microwave sensor is the most complex of the payloads. Since it is positioned on the orbital module still aloft, it is expected to return data on land, sea and atmospheric phenomena for several months. Several space-environment-monitoring sensors are also mounted on the orbital module.
Other zero-g experiments were mounted in the descent module and are undergoing laboratory analysis following their return to Earth. These included fluid physics, materials processing and biotechnology studies. One complex experiment under development for 10 years by the Shanghai Institute for Biological Sciences fused living cells using electrical fields.
The Shenzhou program is China's single largest aerospace effort involving thousands of engineers, dozens of factories and design centers and new command, control and training facilities, most of them under the PLA ( AW&ST Nov. 12, 2001, p. 52). Secretive for years about its 14-man astronaut corps, China last week began to reveal more about the group, showing crewmen undergoing pressure-suit training and parabolic aircraft flights generating 30 sec. of zero-g at a time.
The 9-ton Shenzhou 4 was launched Dec. 30 on board a Long March 2F from Jiuquan in the Gobi Desert. The spacecraft was placed into an initial 124 X 213-mi. orbit. During its fifth revolution, Shenzhou was commanded to fire its engines to circularize the orbit at 213 mi. at an inclination of 42.4 deg. During nearly seven days aloft, the spacecraft performed at least three additional maneuvers.
Commands to the vehicle were issued by flight controllers at the new Beijing Aerospace Command and Control Center. The messages were routed to China's tracking network headquarters in Xian for transmission to Shenzhou from Chinese ground stations and four "Long View" space tracking ships positioned in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans.
Chinese state television views taken inside the new Beijing center during the flight showed multiple display screens with Shenzhou data, including a large center screen providing real-time views of the spacecraft's instrument panel and occasional views of Earth outside the windows. The Shenzhou instrument panel has 4-5 computer display screens. Two instrumented mannequins in spacesuits were on board the vehicle to record temperature, airflow and other parameters.
DURING SHENZHOU'S 107th orbit, the Long View-3 ship positioned in the South Atlantic was used to transmit deorbit commands to the spacecraft. The 11-ft.-long pressurized instrument module was first separated from the descent module so it would remain in orbit. Then engines on the 8,000-lb. aft service module were fired to begin the descent.
The aft module was then separated and burned up in the atmosphere, while the descent vehicle flew a ballistic reentry to a precisely targeted landing at 1116 GMT 20 mi. from Hohhot, Inner Mongolia. Recovery forces using a mobile telemetry facility and five search helicopters were forced to endure temperatures down to-30C.
The three previous unmanned Shenzhou missions were flown in late 1999 and early 2001 and 2002. Of those, the second flight worked well in orbit, but had an apparent malfunction on landing that could have injured or killed any crewmen on board.
Indications are that a parachute problem was involved in the Shenzhou 2 landing incident. And prior to the launch of Shenzhou 4, the Chinese aired meticulous detail about extra testing they had done on the Shenzhou's descent system, which includes a 1,200-sq.-meter main chute and a 760-sq.-meter backup chute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
F/A-22 Production Rate
Sliced in Budget Move
DAVID A. FULGHUM/WASHINGTON
U.S. Air Force and Lockheed Martin officials are trying to understand and adjust to the Pentagon's $876-million restructuring of the F/A-22 program that at first blush would reduce total production by as many as 63 aircraft--to as few as 276 from the original 339 stealthy fighters requested by the service.
TED CARLSON
USAF may be able to afford only around 300 F/A-22s under the current cost cap, not the 339 wanted, but they say the number may grow as production becomes cheaper.
Despite the fact that the 276 total was generated by the Air Force, it is artificially low, say Air Force officials with insight into the F/A-22 program. It's based on the cost of a fighter contracted for in 2003. The price is expected to decrease substantially as more are built and early research and development investments are amortized over a larger fleet. They predict that the actual number of aircraft built under the existing $43-billion price cap for the program will rise to 295 or more as production efficiency improves.
The reduction in numbers is driven by several interrelated developments. The cut in Fiscal 2003 is largely the result of Air Force and contractor cost-reduction efforts not bearing fruit to the extent hoped. The Fiscal 2004 reduction is intended to free up funds in the procurement program to offset shortfalls resulting from extension of the development phase. Both issues have led to fewer production aircraft, which in turn means the F/A-22 manufacturing effort isn't benefiting from production lessons as quickly as expected and therefore costs aren't coming down fast enough. Although the new program plan drives up the notionally average unit cost of the aircraft, program officials see a silver lining. The Defense Dept. estimates are so conservative that it should be easy for the Air Force to surpass demand, thereby boosting production numbers and putting an end to the spiral of bad news for the program that resulted from setting overly aggressive goals, a program representative said.
"We believe that range is achievable and that is our goal," said an Air Force official close to the program. "We believe, with stability in this program [possibly through C-17-type multi-year contracts], and if we can reestablish confidence in the supplier base, that we can significantly reduce the cost of these airplanes. We're making investment to do that. We hope to see the benefits of that as early as next year."
Others question the focus on total numbers. They contend the real threat to the F/A-22 program is the slowdown in production. The faster Lockheed Martin can climb to the most efficient production rate of 38 aircraft per year, the sooner greater savings will result.
"That will make it cheaper for however many you buy," a senior Air Force official said. "If you don't get to 38, production isn't efficient for the amount of tooling you bought." The new acquisition schedule slides peak production back three years to 2010 from 2007. The actual cut in production numbers will likely not be known with any certitude for years--until the cost of the aircraft stabilizes.
AN INDUSTRY ANALYST said, "It appears that the PBD says the Air Force is still authorized to build 333 [plus six engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) aircraft] if they can make the numbers work. The new plan does 'shallow out' the ramp-up rate to full production through 2009. The Air Force total is not overturned." Nonetheless, Air Force officials believe that the actual number of aircraft bought is likely to be nearer 300 than 339.
The new number in the program budget decision approved by Pentagon comptroller Dov Zakheim roughly splits the difference of the estimated $690-million-$1-billion cost overrun in EMD, estimated by the Air Force in November. In addition to $763 million shifted from the F/A-22 procurement account to R&D, Zakheim moved $113 million in Fiscal 2003 from the stealthy aircraft's operational system development account.
Changes in dollars and airframes projected through Fiscal 2009 by Pentagon acquisition officials include:
$106-million reduction in 2003 with the production rate dropping from 23 aircraft to 20.
$371 million in 2004, from 27 aircraft to 22.
$210 million in 2005, from 32 aircraft to 24.
$76 million in 2006, reducing from 36 to 26.
Reduction from 38 to 31 in 2007.
Reduction from 38 to 32 in 2008.
Reduction from 38 to 34 in 2009.
Production rates for 2010 and 2011 were planned at 38 and are not thought to have changed.
A statement from the Air Force says the service remains committed to a buy-to-budget strategy approved at the August 2001 Defense Acquisition Board for low-rate initial production, and will continue to pursue options for acquiring a minimum of 339 aircraft. Service officials said they stand behind conclusions of a study generated by Defense Planning Guidance. It recommended a "fleet of at least 381 F/A-22s as a balance between operational needs and risks in a fiscally constrained environment." Air Force planners concede in a written statement that funding EMD cost growth within existing program funds, as they intend to do, "could result in a small reduction in total quantity."
Both the Pentagon and Air Force totals are far less than the 381 aircraft requirement needed to equip 10 Air Expeditionary Forces and compensate for attrition reserve and training that was the service's goal. Currently the cost of each aircraft is approximately $189 million, but analysts worry that any reduction could be the start of the traditional spiral in which numbers go down--thereby driving costs up--which, in turn, leads to more cuts to meet the production cap.
"We could be starting down that slippery slope that killed B-2 production," said a senior Air Force official who is an F/A-22 advocate. "It could turn into a graveyard spiral, and one more hiccup in cost could change it from a force structure aircraft to a silver bullet. Reductions make the early aircraft very expensive. But the program is recoverable if it stays smooth through production."
Others warned about predicating programs on estimated costs.
"We make a big mistake when we use the average unit price of an aircraft to make a decision because we never know how many will ultimately be bought," said a recently retired Air Force program manager. "During the last year of the [President Jimmy] Carter administration Canada and Australia wanted to buy the F-15, but nobody could give them a price because it was supposed to be in the last year of production. So they bought the F/A-18 instead and the F-15 is still in production. So how many F/A-22s will we buy? It will be different from any number that's on the boards today."
Some senior Air Force planners and Defense Dept. civilians have suggested that additional F/A-22 requirements could be fulfilled by other types of aircraft and capabilities. The idea of dissimilar competition late in an aircraft's production cycle is to ensure cost pressure is maintained on the contractor. Senior defense civilians initially proposed pitting the F/A-18E/F against the Joint Strike Fighter for dissimilar competition, only now Air Force planners worry that both the F-35 and unmanned combat air vehicle could become competition for the F/A-22.
With juggling the F/A-22 program, speculation has increased about the effect of new draft 5000-series acquisition rules that have been in circulation in recent weeks.
"THERE ARE NO MORE RULES, just a lot of referees," said a recently retired Air Force program manager. Military program managers feel they are micromanaged by the Pentagon's senior civilians but then are always assigned blame when a program goes over budget and schedule. "The 5000 series are still there as a guide. But we won't really know what the new rules are until after the first few DABs [defense acquisition boards] have been run. Little by little, the important rules will be put back in place. From what I've read, there's not much difference. Spiral acquisition has been around a long time. It's like block development. It's planning in stages.
"The annual budgeting process is extremely deleterious to program stability and we tend to blame Congress. But the Air Force actually did a study of three years of rephasing of the F/A-22 program and discovered that they had made the most cuts and Congress made the fewest. The major wounds were self-inflicted. But with all its problems the acquisition team's products--like Joint Stars, JDAM, C-17--work magnificently."