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By: - 26th November 2005 at 19:21 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Interesting.
I think the changes over the decades were the answer to the respective threat environment and the fact that USN carrier groups in their first years were based in the Pacific theatre.
First nobody really knew how capable a carrier air wing was, the carriers were tasked with scouting and escorting the armored units, and the fast armored surface units (BB, BC) was the pimary threat.
Then the Uboot was seen as the bigger threat, and the battle group structure also changed because there were no fast battleships available. You can only use what you have. Although the propability of a Uboot gaining a hit on a fast moving carrier was fairly small.
When those fast BBs were finally operational, the BB was basically only used as AAA platform and monitors at amphib ops. The aircraft was the prime threat, with the Uboot a close second.
After WW2 for long years to come the Uboot was the only threat to a carrier battle group, so the ASW screen was extended, first with DDs, later with helicopters, land-based assets, and even CVS (but those usually operated independently from the CBGs).
And as the anti ship missile more and more became the weapon of choice, instead of the torpedo, air cover was extended.
On of the biggest mistakes in my view the USN made in the past twenty years - and they made plenty of them - was the abandonment of nuclear powered surface escort vessels like the Virginias, and even the smaller units down to the Bainbridges.
If you ask me, what escort a nuclear powered carrier needs for blue water operations (and brown water operations of CVNs should be avoided at all costs), I say three to four nuclear powered escort cruisers of around 15000 tons and one or two nuclear powered replenishment vessels. The escort cruisers provide SAM cover plus close-in ASW cover by helicopter, the carrier does his usual job, including wide-area ASW by CTOL aircraft. All ships have to be able to move at high speeds in heavy sea states, hence the 15000ts for the escorts.
It's not important if you call it CDG or DDG, as long as there is an "N" attached to it. Only with nuclear propulsion a battle group can move fast and wide, additional ammo and jet fuel for longer operations are carried by the replenishers. Including an attack Uboot is a waste of resourses. Operationally misplaced.
And today? No threat in (political) sight. Even pulled all the Vikings out of the pacific (even the USN says there are about 250 foreign submarines in the pacific, including Chinese) and into the atlantic (where there are no "enemy" submarines to speak of. As long as the USN isn't designing their pacific CBGs for a potential fight with China, they might as well operate their CVNs all alone. And for a fight with China, the Ticonderogas and Burkes are short legged, thirsty and unable to keep up with the carrier at all sea states.
By: - 27th November 2005 at 06:42 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Re nuclear powered escorts for the USN.
Read the book Eletctronic Greyhounds, the Spruance Class Destroyers (which also covers the Kidds and Ticonderoga's).
In that it becomes apparent that it was going to be the Spruance class or nothing.
Rickover and his nuclear mafia were adament that anything over 8,000 tons was going to have a nuclear reactor, and the costs meant that the USN would not have been able to afford the Spruance class capability on a nuke powered hull.
Same applied with the Ticonderoga's.
The fight was quite nasty within the Pentagon and Congress, but the cost of nuclear propulsion is such that if they had decreed a nuke-powered Aegis class, it would never have been built.
The other issue with nuclear propulsion is that it's benefits are oversold.
Sure a CVN can race across the oceans at high speeds, but it still needs to rendesvous with a conventionally powered replenishment group every few days or so to supply food, aviation fuel, spare parts etc, etc.
Making a few escorts nuclear powered will not change that basic limitation, and will only ensure that the USN has even fewer escorts available, due to the much higher unit costs.
Unicorn
By: - 27th November 2005 at 15:37 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
The costs and political situation surrounding nuclear powered vessels is known.
Nevertheless I think they are worth it, and regarding the fleet replenishers, as I said, they should have built some nuclear powered ones.
One of the reasons for sky-high costs of nuclear vessels was the evolving reactor design (all the company R&D had to be show up in the customers "retail price"), plus the very short refill-times of the first generaton reactors, plus the fact that the USN never standardized on a design, or used a modular approach, meaning that carriers, cruisers and ballistic boats would use the same model of reactor.
And your point of the even smaller number of escorts built if they are nuclear powered, I ask how many should a carrier have? ASW is done airborne almost exclusively, a ASW-type escort couldn't do its job *and* keep up with a nuclear CBG anyway, so ASW is not the job of an escort, leaving anti-air as its main job. And for that you don't need more than four escort cruisers. Makes 12x CVN + 36/48x CEN + 12/24x AOEN as the surface blue water navy.
And one last word on the composition of the late 1980's/early 1990's CBGs: Those Perry class FFGs were a joke, unable to stay with the rest speedwise, and much too light to keep up in heavy weather. They were a kind of permanent temporary solution for operations in tight waters (like the Med) and a direct consequence of the elimination of the CVS groups, but their real value was very limited.
By: - 27th November 2005 at 16:35 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
You make MANY assertions not based on fact.
Ill just start with three:
"they might as well operate their CVNs all alone."
"ASW is not the job of an escort"
"They were a kind of permanent temporary solution for operations in tight waters (like the Med) and a direct consequence of the elimination of the CVS groups, ......"
But Im all eyes and ears waiting for you to provide any documents, articles, studies, website links, book excerpts or other credible material to support your contentions.
Otherwise Ill just have to assume your a "troll".
Concerning OH Perry class "but their real value was very limited.". This is very debatable. They indeed had limitations but as for "real value" people may actually be surprised as to how useful they have been over their service life.. So here too Im interested in how you came up with that conclusion.
As for top-end speed and fuel endurance you vastly overstate the drawbacks especially as concerns the Ticonderoga class.
The Knox class frigates were slower even than the OH Perry class. Yet they were integral parts of every Carrier's escort screen from the beginning of their introduction into the fleet.
You have alot of opinions but are extremely short on facts and reality.
By: - 28th November 2005 at 08:41 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Why that hostility, son?
The Perry and Knox classes were designed as escort vessels for convois sailing the SLOC, not as an escort for a CBG. in the old language, they were not "ships of the line", not in any way designed to be part of the cover of a carrier.
And operating CVNs without close escort cover is not my invention, it was done several times during exercises, e.g. in the Med.
I didn't say that Ticonderoga was too slow, just short-legged to keep up with a nuclear carrier operating at high speeds. Ticonderoga has a range of about 6000nm at 20kn, a Burke 8000nm at the same speed. They were designed with the air wing replenishment cycles in mind.
This means for east bound vessels refueling in Spain, then again in e.g. Aden to reach the Indian Ocean and have fuel left for operations.
At the same time that makes them rely on the Suez Canal, as they don't have the range to go around Africa if needed (or you pre-position a number of tankers off South Africa). Same goes for the Panama Canal route going west from Norfolk.
And going west from the West Coast means, you have to refill in Pearl and Guam before entering your area of operations.
So you either use T-AOE (of which the USN has just four), or T-AO (of which the USN has fourteen) - if you can support two CBGs with that number, besides all the other needs of the fleet, you are good. Or you use harbors to refuel and become quite predictable in your approaches and cycle of action.
The point is, that only nuclear powered escorts (and replenishers) can operate in a way, that allows the carrier to use its full potential as a rapidly moving and hard to calculate regional center of gravity. If you use a conventional escort (which needs to refuel every five days or so during high speed carrier operations), your rythm and cycle of operations is dictated by those escorts, not the capabilities of the nuclear carrier.
By: - 29th November 2005 at 01:02 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Not hostility.
But you make statements that are not based on fact, history or reality.
When asked to provide any documentation to back up your statements. Nothing but more of the same.
"The Perry and Knox classes were designed as escort vessels for convois sailing the SLOC, not as an escort for a CBG. in the old language, they were not "ships of the line", not in any way designed to be part of the cover of a carrier."
The Knox class like the Brooke/Garcia class before it were designed to replace the WWII built destroyers with an emphasis on ASW but they were not what the USN hoped for and that program was curtailed.
Nevertheless they escorted carriers from their introduction into the fleet.
Indeed originally the OH Perry class was conceived as a low-cost convoy escort but with the Spruance class(much criticized also) which was the next attempt to replace the WWII destroyers also curtailed these ships and its design evolved into carrier escorts.
I have shown (see above) their inclusion in carrier battlegroups.
You have not shown me any carrier that operated unescorted. When you do I may reconsider my opinion of you.
You have disparaged and ignored my research.
Then said Im hostile?
You have offered nothing but useless opinions that are not based on fact,, history or reality.
Even after I asked you for specific information none and I mean absolutely nothing was forthcoming from you.
You are entitled to your opinion but not entitled to portray it as fact.
Dont patronise me by calling me "son".
Im a 49 year old Navy veteran and while you may not respect that many do.
Your arrogance and ignorance is beyond belief.
BTW the Burke class range is 4400nm at 20kts.
When you provide answers to my original entreaty:
"Ill just start with three:
"they might as well operate their CVNs all alone."
"ASW is not the job of an escort"
"They were a kind of permanent temporary solution for operations in tight waters (like the Med) and a direct consequence of the elimination of the CVS groups, ......""
Ill consider continuing this discourse.
I doubt if you can or will.
So Adios.
Thanks for hijacking my thread.
Ill return the favor someday.
Posts: 182
By: rickusn - 26th November 2005 at 16:33
This is a little essay Im working on tracing USN surface combatant and carrier battlegroup evolution.
(Sorry diagram wont paste. See link below.)
The above is a typical USN tactical formation circa 1940. When battleships were still the primary offensive weapon. It was an enormus battlegroup consisting of Battleships, a carrier, cruisers, destroyers and destroyer minelayers.
http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume1_number2_Oct02/articles/article_hone1_doctrine.doc.htm#_ednref37
In December 1941 on the eve of the start of WWII the Enterprise (CV-6) battlegroup consisted of three cruisers and a nine destroyer DESRON.
CV Enterprise
CA Salt Lake City, Northampton, Chester
DD DesRon6 Balch/SF
DesDiv11: Gridley, Craven, McCall, Maury
DesDiv12: Dunlap. Fanning, Benham, Ellet
http://pacific.valka.cz/forces/tf8.htm#wake1
As the #s in the chart below show those #'s per carrier could not be sustained during WWII.
A typical carrier battlegroup in 1944 consisted of two large Essex class carriers and one small Independence class carrier in addition to CRUDIV of four cruisers(CA,CL,CLAA) and a DESRON of nine destroyers.
CV USS Enterprise - Capt. M.B. Gardner
Air Group 10 - 32 F6F, 30 SBD, 16 TBF; 4 F4U (night fighters)
CV USS Yorktown - Capt. R.E. Jennings
Air Group 5 - 37 F6F, 36 SBD, 18 TBF; 4 F6F (night fighters)
CVL USS Belleau Wood - Capt. A.M. Pride
Air Group 24 - 24 F6F, 8 TBF
Crudiv 13
R. Adm. L.T. DuBose
CL USS Santa Fe - Capt. J. Wright
CL USS Mobile - Capt. C.J. Wheeler
CL USS Biloxi - Capt. D.M. McGurl
CLAA USS Oakland - Capt. W.K. Phillips
Desron 50
Capt. S.R. Clark
DD USS C.K. Bronson - Lt. Cdr. J.C. McGoughran
DD USS Cotten - Cdr. F.T. Sloat
DD USS Dortch - Cdr. R.C. Young
DD USS Gatling - Cdr. A.F. Richardson
DD USS Healey - Cdr. J.C. Atkeson
DD USS Cogswell - Cdr. H.T. Deuterman
DD USS Caperton - Cdr. W.J. Miller
DD USS Ingersoll - Cdr. A.C. Veasey
DD USS Knapp - Cdr. F. Virden
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/field/ch3b.htm
We also can see the drastic drawdown from VJ day to the start of the Korean War on 25June 1950.
Notice the USN appears to have gone to great lengths to preserve the destroyer force.
Type 8/14/45* 6/30/46 6/30/47 6/30/48 6/30/49 6/30/50
Battleships 23 10 4 2 1 1
Carriers, Fleet 28 15 14 13 11 11
Carriers, Escort 71 10 8 7 7 4
Cruisers 72 36 32 32 18 13
Destroyers 377 145 138 134 143 137
Frigates 361 35 24 12 12 10
Submarines 232 85 80 74 79 72
SSBNs - - - - - -
Command Ships - - - - - -
Mine Warfare 586 112 55 54 52 56
Patrol 1204 119 74 50 50 33
Amphibious 2547 275 107 86 60 79
Auxiliary 1267 406 306 273 257 218
Surface Warships 833 226 198 180 174 161
Total Active 6768 1248 842 737 690 634
http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org9-4.htm
On the eve of the Korean War a typical carrier battlegroup looked like this:
TASK FORCE 77. STRIKING FORCE. VICE ADMIRAL Arthur. D. STRUBLE, USN
Task Group 77.1. Support Group. Captain Edward L. Woodyard, USN.
Rochester (CA-124)
(Fleet Flagship) 1 Heavy Cruiser.
Task Group 77.2. Screening Group. Captain Charles W. Parker, USN
Destroyer Division 31 [ less Keyes and Hollister plus Radford and Fletcher]:
Shelton (DD-790), Eversole (DD-789), Radford (DD-446), Fletcher (DD-445) 4 Destroyers
Destroyer Division 32:
Maddox (DD-731), Samuel L. Moore (DD-747), Brush (DD-745), Taussig (DD-746) 4 Destroyer
Task Group 77.4. Carrier Group. Rear Admiral John. M. Hoskins.
Valley Forge (CV-45) (Flagship)
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/field/ch3b.htm
The chart below shows the build-up of the fleet in the 1950s. The impetus of course being the Korean war.
Notice the Battlship, cruiser and escort carrier categories took hits with the end of the war in July 1953.
Eight ship DESRON's had become the norm although as few as six and as many as thirteen ship were sometimes assigned.
Type 6/30/51 6/30/52 6/30/53 6/30/54 6/30/55 6/30/56 6/30/57
Battleships 3 4 4 4 3 3 2
Carriers, Fleet 17 19 19 20 21 22 22
Carriers, Escort 9 10 10 7 3 2 -
Cruisers 15 19 19 18 17 16 16
Destroyers 206 243 247 247 249 250 253
Frigates 38 56 56 57 64 70 84
Submarines 83 104 108 108 108 108 113
SSG/SSBNs 1 1 2 2 1 2 2
Command Ships - - - - - 1 1
Mine Warfare 91 114 121 117 112 113 104
Patrol 40 29 23 22 15 11 12
Amphibious 208 189 226 223 175 139 134
Auxiliary 269 309 287 288 262 236 224
Surface Warships 262 322 326 326 333 339 355
Total Active 980 1097 1122 1113 1030 973 967
Type 6/30/58 6/30/59 6/30/60 6/30/61 6/30/62 6/30/63 6/30/64
Battleships - - - - - - -
Carriers 24 23 23 24 26 24 24
Cruisers 15 12 13 12 13 18 24
Destroyers 245 237 226 223 240 222 215
Frigates 71 61 41 41 68 40 40
Submarines 109 109 106 105 104 102 102
SSG/SSBNs 2 4 7 10 14 17 23
Command Ships 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Mine Warfare 77 82 81 83 84 84 84
Patrol 12 6 4 4 2 - -
Amphibious 121 120 113 110 130 132 133
Auxiliary 213 205 197 206 218 216 212
Surface Warships 331 310 280 276 321 280 279
Total Active 890 860 812 819 900 857 859
In the late 50's the WWII built DE's began to be retired again in great #'s. The decommissioning of the escort carriers made them less useful. But their slow speed which had seen their almost comlete demise by 1950 was again seen as a liability for ASW work along with general obsolescence. By the end of 1960 only 24 remained and twenty-two of these had been reconfigured as radar-pickets during the mid-50's to man the DEW line (Distant Early Warning).
This time also saw the decommissiong of 33 (in addition to six decommissioned shortly after the end of the Korean War 1953-1954) of the 100 Fletcher class destroyers in-commission during the Korean War.
Thirteen DE's of the Dealey class completed from 1954-1958. Most of the nine Atlantic fleet units escorted the USS Wasp CVS-18 on a MED cruise mid- 1958. They were not conceived originally for this task but the DE category were now being seen as integral battlegroup participants.
Beginning with the Garcia/Brooke class and continuing with the Knox and later Oliver Hazard Perry classes this was the case as replacements for the mass of WWII destroyers that even with FRAM refits were nominally programmed to be retired five to eight years after completion. Although many served for much longer.
The FRAM (Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization) beginning in 1959 and lasting through 1965 saw 33 Sumner class and 95 Gearing class destroyers become essentially fast ASW frigates. With the removal of anti-surface torpedos and 3" AA guns all that remained for those roles were their 5" dual purpose guns.
Also from the late 50's through the mid-60's the USN built AAW guided-missle destroyers and frigates(redesignated cruisers or destroyers depending on the class in 1975. This redesignation is reflected in the chart above beginning in 1963.). There were also a number of destroyer and cruiser conversions to AAW guided-missle ships.
So by 1970 a carrier battle was nominally made up of four AAW ships and eight destroyers or destroyer escorts(redesignated frigates in 1975).
The USN was very unhappy with the Knox class frigates and the follow-on class of Oliver Hazard Perry class.
So while the ships were actually serving in carrier battlegroups in official documents they were relegated to Amphibious Task Groups, Underway Replenishment Groups and Convoy duty.
See link below for the 1979 requirement table on page 39.:
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/51xx/doc5175/doc15-Entire.pdf
The requirements were updated in 1982. See USNI Proceedings May 1985 for the chart on page 185.
There is one on the internet I think but cant find the link.
Nominal Composition per carrier:
2 Guided missle cruisers
2 Guided missle destroyers
2 Destroyers(DD 963 class)
In the January 1988 USNI Proceedings Captain (then Commander)George Galdorisi produced a chart on page 106:
Nominal Carrier Battle Group Composition
1 Carrier
2 Guided missle cruisers
2 Guided missle destroyers
2 Destroyers (DD963s)
4-6 Frigates (FF-1052s)/Guded missle Frigates (FFG-7s)
1-2 Nuclear-powered attack submarines (direct support)
1 Fast combat support ships/oilers
Notice he includes the frigates in the nominal composition whereas the official USN compositions do not.
The early decommissioning of the 1950's built DL Mitscher class( 2 1969 and 2 1978) and DD Forrest Sherman class(18 1982-1983) added to the pressure to provide adequate escorts for all the USN's combat formations.
Nonetheless Knox and Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates began entering non-deploying NRF(Naval Reserve Force) service, 13 and 16 respectively from 1982 through 1991.
From 1988 through 1992 sixteen Garcia/Brooke FF's, nine Coontz class DDG's, twenty-two CF Adams class DDG's and thirty Knox class were decommissioned.
In late 1992 the nominal carrier battle group consisted of :
1 Carrier
4 Guided missle cruisers/Guided missle destroyers
4 Spruance class destroyers
4 OH Perry class frigates
2 SSN
1 Combat Support Ship
There were twelve carrier battle groups requiring 144 escorts if all were up to strength this wasnt the case.*
*See Norman Polmar's Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet 1993 for exact composition of the carrier battlegroups.
There were 49 cruisers(One cruiser, Belknap, was the 6th fleet flagship and is not included) and 7 guided missle destroyers more than enough to suffice by eight. But only 31 Spruance class destroyers coming up 17 short. Of the 67 frigates only 35(13 short) were assigned to the carrier battlegroups all OH Perry class.
Sixteen OH Perry class along with eight Knox class were in NRF service. Plus eight other Knox class scheduled to be in 1993. So there were enough ships in-service but barely.
But in late 1993 in another cost-cutting move 18 CG's of the Leahy/Belknap class began decommissioning all but one gone by the end of September 1994.
The surviving Knox class frigates all left service by the end of June 1994.
In addition between 1994-1999 all seven of the nuclear powered cruisers left service.
OH Perry class frigates also began to leave service in 1994.
In the mid-1990's the OH Perry class fulfilled in part the guided missle destroyer/destroyer role for which they were ill-equipped. As enough A Burkes were not yet in service.
The USN attempted to mitigate this by reducing the carrier battlegroups to six ships but soon reverted to eight as sufficient A Burke class guided missle destroyers entered service.
Selected CVBG compositions of the mid-1990s. The Atlantic Fleet on page 78 and the Pacific Fleet on page 79:
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97057.pdf
Another CVBG:
May 1996-November 1996
The Carl Vinson Task Group includes the guided missile
cruisers USS Arkansas (CGN 41), USS California (CGN 36) and USS Shiloh (CG 67), fast combat support ship USS Camden(AOE 2), guided missile frigate USS Crommelin (FFG 37) and attack submarines USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) and USS Hawkbill (SSN 666).
In FY 1996 there was a reorganization of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets:
Pacific Fleet reorganization underway
WASHINGTON (NNS) -- (This is the second of a two-part series highlighting the reorganization of the Atlantic and Pacific
fleets.)
The Pacific Fleet's surface ships are being reorganized
into six core battle groups and eight destroyer squadrons.
The reorganization is scheduled to be completed by Oct. 1, withhomeport changes completed within the next year.
Permanent core battle groups will include a battle group commander, aircraftcarrier, carrier air wing and at least two cruisers.
While most of the reorganization will be accomplished by
realigning existing shore commands and the staffs of operational commanders, the following changes will apply:
San Diego:
- A regional support organization will be established to cover
administrative and maintenance support for ships which do not
deploy as port of their core battle group.
- Commander Destroyer Readiness Squadrons 13 and 33 will be disestablished, with the billets reassigned to new or existing
commands in San Diego.
Pearl Harbor:
- Commander Destroyer Squadron 5 will shift homeport from San Diego to Pearl Harbor.
- Commander Naval Surface Group Middle Pacific will be the Immediate Superior In Charge (ISIC) for all non- cruiser/destroyer ships in Pearl Harbor.
Everett, Wash.:
- Commander Destroyer Squadron 9 has moved from San Diego to Everett.
- Commander Logistics Group One will move to Everett and serve as Commander Naval Surface Group Pacific Northwest while maintaining ISIC responsibilities for logistics ships.
Once the transition period is complete, the following ship
assignments will apply:
- Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group One/USS Constellation
Battle Group: USS Lake Erie and USS Chosin.
- Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group Five/USS Kitty Hawk Battle Group: USS Cowpens and USS Antietam.
- Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group Three/USS Carl Vinson
Battle Group: USS Shiloh, USS California and USS Arkansas.
- Commander Carrier Group Seven/USS Nimitz Battle Group: USS Port Royal and USS Lake Champlain.
- Commander Carrier Group Three/USS Abraham Lincoln Battle
Group: USS Princeton and USS Chancellorsville.
- Commander Carrier Group Five/USS Independence Battle Group: USS Bunker Hill and USS Mobile Bay.
- Destroyer Squadron 1(all NRF except Reid): USS Copeland, USS George Philip, USS John A. Moore, USS Lewis B. Puller, USS Mahlon S. Tisdale, USS Sides, USS Wadsworth and USS Reid.
- Destroyer Squadron 5: USS Cushing, USS John S. McCain, USS Ingersoll, USS Crommelin and USS Reuben James.
- Destroyer Squadron 7: USS Elliot, USS Curtis Wilbur, USS
Merrill, USS John Paul Jones and USS Harry Hill.
- Destroyer Squadron 9: USS Paul F. Foster, USS David R. Ray, USS Callaghan, USS Chandler, USS Ford and USS Ingraham.
- Destroyer Squadron 15: USS Fife, USS Hewitt, USS O'Brien,
USS Curts, USS McClusky, USS Rodney M. Davis and USS Thatch.
- Destroyer Squadron 21: USS Kinkaid, USS Stethem, USS
Benfold, USS Valley Forge, USS Jarrett and USS Rentz.
- Destroyer Squadron 23: USS Oldendorf, USS John Young, USS Fitzgerald, USS Vincennes, USS Garry and USS Vandegrift.
- Destroyer Squadron 31: USS Fletcher, USS Leftwich, USS
Russell and USS Paul Hamilton.
NORFOLK, Va. (NNS) -- The Atlantic Fleet's surface combatant
ships are being reorganized into six core battle groups, nine
destroyer squadrons and a new Western Hemisphere Group.
The reorganization will be phased in over the summer and take effect Aug. 31, with homeport shifts occurring through 1998.
The plan focuses on developing squadron integrity, increasing
Sailors' time in homeport, economizing training, and providing a
more efficient organization to meet Western Hemisphere
requirements.
The greatest savings and improvements in efficiency are
expected to come from tailoring intermediate and advanced training to the missions the ships will perform.
All ships will still complete the basic training phase, but for some the overall training time could be cut between 20 and 44 days.
The change in training strategy should bring about 17 percent less time at sea between deployments for most cruisers, destroyers and frigates.
Once reorganization is completed, two cruisers will be
permanently assigned to each carrier battle group. At the start of the intermediate training phase, a four-ship destroyer squadron, two submarines and a replenishment ship will join the core group to establish the battle group.
Nine destroyer squadrons will be used to support the six
carrier battle groups, as well as supporting commitments with the Middle East Force, NATO's Standing Naval Force and
other required operations.
The squadrons will be assigned to the battle groups on a rotational basis, depending on where they are in their maintenance and deployment cycles.
With minimal homeport changes, ships will be phased into their new squadrons upon completion of their current deployment cycle.
The ships in the Western Hemisphere Group will be homeported
in Mayport, Fla., and Pascagoula, Miss.
These ships will be tasked primarily with supporting operations in the Caribbean and South America.
USS Ticonderoga and USS Yorktown will move to Pascagoula
in 1996. USS Thomas S. Gates will join them in FY98.
Four ships will move to Mayport; USS Robert G. Bradley (FY97), USS Conolly (1996-97), USS Scott (1997) and USS Kidd (1998) , to join USS Moosbrugger, USS Dewert, USS McInerney, USS Boone, USS Doyle, USS Aubrey Fitch and USS Stark.
When the transition period is complete, the following ship
assignments will apply:
- Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group Two/George Washington
Battle Group: USS South Carolina and USS Normandy.
- Commander Carrier Group Two/John C. Stennis Joint Task
Group: USS San Jacinto and USS Monterey. Monterey is scheduled to join the group in 1996-97.
- Commander Carrier Group Six/John F. Kennedy/America Joint
Task Group: USS Vicksburg, USS Hue City and USS Thomas. S. Gates until Gates transfers to the Western Hemisphere Group in June 1998.
- Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group Eight/Eisenhower Joint
Task Group: USS Anzio and USS Cape St. George.
- Commander Carrier Group Eight/Theodore Roosevelt Joint Task Group: USS Leyte Gulf, USS Vella Gulf and USS Mississippi. Mississippi is scheduled for decommissioning during FY97.
- Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group Twelve/Enterprise Joint
Task Group: USS Philippine Sea and USS Gettysburg.
Destroyer squadron assignments under the reorganization
require no ship homeport changes.
Norfolk-based Destroyer Squadrons 2, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28 and 32; and Mayport-based Destroyer Squadrons 14 and 24 each will have four ships assigned permanently as follows:
- Destroyer Squadron 2: USS Arleigh Burke, USS Deyo, USS
Stump and USS Kauffman.
- Destroyer Squadron 14: USS John Rodgers, USS Obannon, USS Underwood, and USS Carney in FY96.
- Destroyer Squadron 18: USS Stout, USS Nicholson, USS Thorn and USS Nicholas.
- Destroyer Squadron 20: USS Mitscher, USS Briscoe, USS
Klakring, USS Robert G. Bradley until transfer to Western
Hemisphere Group in August 1997, and USS Gonzalez in FY96.
- Destroyer Squadron 22: USS Laboon, USS Caron, USS Simpson, and USS Cole in FY96.
- Destroyer Squadron 24: USS Spruance, USS John Hancock, USS Taylor, and USS The Sullivans in FY97.
- Destroyer Squadron 26: USS Barry, USS Arthur W. Radford,
USS Comte de Grasse and USS Samuel B. Roberts.
- Destroyer Squadron 28: USS Peterson, USS Elrod, USS
Halyburton, and USS Ross in FY97.
- Destroyer Squadron 32: USS Ramage, USS Hayler, USS Hawes and USS Carr.
Note: DESRON 1 in the Pacific fleet was analogous to DESRON 6 of the Western Hemisphere group in the Atlantic Fleet.
Which was left out of the above reorganization news listing DESRON 6 contained seven NRF ships. Two other active ships that were shortly to be decommissioned were also left out:
USS Antrim
USS Clark
USS Estocin
USS Fahrion
USS Flately
USS OH Perry
USS SE Morison
USS Gallery
USS J Williams
In 1998-1999 the four Kidd class DDG's and seven Spruance class DD's prematurely decommissioned.
In 1998 there was another reorganization the Pacific fleet lost one DESRON and the Atlantic fleet lost three. The ships from those DESRONs were reassigned to the remaining DESRONs
Nominal make-up of a carrier battlegroup:
2 Ticonderoga class guided-muissle cruisers
2 A Burke class guided missle destroyers
2 Spruance class destroyers
2 OH Perry class frigates
Note: The author has hard copies of the Atlantic Fleet DESRON's make-up in October of 1998 and 1999.
At the beginning of 2000 the surface fleet consisted of:
27 Ticonderoga class cruisers
28 A Burke I/II destroyers
24 Spruance class destroyers
36 OH Perry class
2000-2005 saw the decommissioing of the remaining Spruance class destroyers and more OH Perry class frigates.
In 2002 a decision was made to remove the MK 13 launcher for firing Standard/Harpoon missles from the OH Perry class frigates. This in effect made them essentially mini-helo carriers or large patrol frigates depending on your perspective
In 2002 the USN decided to break up the carrier battlegroups. Leaving three escorts with the carrier, adding three escorts to amphibious ready groups and forming three ship surface action groups.
The were renamed Carrier Strike Groups(CSG), Expeditioary Strike Groups(ESG) and Surface Strike Groups(SSG) respectively.
These separate and distinct formations can be brought together to form a Naval Expeditionary Force(NEF).
The NEF resembling nothing so much as a the previous combined Carrier Battle Group/Amphibious Ready Group/Surface Action Group formations that were assembled under the umbrella of the Commander, Carrier Battle Group staff from the mid-1990's to early in this decade.
The main difference is that the escorts assigned to the ARG and SAG have been formalized rather than being ad hoc.
Nominal compositions:
12 CSG:
1 Ticonderoga class cruiser
1 A Burke I/II* destroyer
1 A Burke IIA destoyer
12 ESG:
1 Ticonderoga class cruiser
1 A Burke class destroyer
1 OH Perry class frigate(Eventually to be replaced by DD(X))
9 SSG:
3 A Burke class destroyers
*The A Burke I/II destroyers could operate with LAMPs III helicopters including refueling and rearming but have no hanger.
The USN does not yet have enough A. Burke class destroyers to make this happen.
Although with 22 Ticonderoga class cruisers*, 47 A Burke destroyers** and 30 OH Perry class frigates there are enough ships existing.
Sea Swap also helps mitigate the short-fall somewhat.
*The five non-VLS shisp were decommissioned 2004-2005.
** 28 Burke I/II and 19 Burke IIA( these have helo hanger facilities)
The OH Perry class frigates operate in conjunction with an A Burke I/II destroyer in the ESG's and sometimes SSG's.
The 14 OH Perry class frigates still used in battlegroups are only placeholders until enough A. Burkes and DD(X) are built.
All 30 of the remaining OH Perry class frigates are nominally to be replaced by some 60 LCS(Littoral Combat Ship).
A comparison of the USS John F Kennedy CV-67 Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and the new Carrier Strike Group(CSG):
Release Date: 7/19/2002 12:03:00 PM
Also being relieved of the watch in the Arabian Sea are: Carrier Air Wing Seven (CVW 7) from Oceana, Va.; Mayport-based USS Vicksburg (CG 69), and the Norfolk-based fast combat support ship USS Seattle (AOE 3).
The remaining ships of the Kennedy Battle Group, all Mayport-based, remain deployed overseas. They include: USS Hue City (CG 66), USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) , USS Carney (DDG 64), USS Roosevelt (DDG 80), USS Spruance (DD 963), USS Underwood (FFG 36), and USS Taylor (FFG 50).
Two attack submarines are also members of the Kennedy Battle Group: USS Toledo (SSN 769), home ported in Groton, Conn., and the Norfolk-based USS Boise (SSN 764).
Kennedy deployed in early February and has been the only U.S. carrier supporting Operation Enduring Freedom since April.
Release Date: 3/5/2004 9:40:00 AM
-- Ships and aircraft of the USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) Carrier Strike Group (CSG) are in the midst of their Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX).
Commanded by Rear Adm. Donald K. Bullard, Commander, Carrier Group 6, the JFK CSG is comprised of the Mayport, Fla.-based ships John F. Kennedy, commanded by Capt. Ronald H. Henderson; the guided-missile cruiser USS Vicksburg (CG 69); the guided-missile destroyer USS Roosevelt (DDG 80); the destroyer USS Spruance (DD 963); the fast combat support ship USS Seattle (AOE 3), homeported in Earle, N.J.; the attack submarine USS Toledo (SSN 769), homeported in Groton, Conn., and Carrier Air Wing 17, commanded by Capt. Mark D. Guadagnini, embarked aboard USS John F. Kennedy.
Heres the USS George Washington CVBG 2002 and CSG 2004:
Release Date: 12/18/2002 12:51:00 PM
-- More than 7,500 Sailors and Marines assigned to the ships and squadrons of the USS George Washington (CVN 73) Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) will return to Norfolk this week, completing a six-month combat deployment in the Arabian Gulf, in addition to operations in the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean.
On Dec. 20, returning units include USS George Washington; Commander, Destroyer Squadron Two; the guided-missile cruisers USS Normandy (CG 60) and USS Monterey (CG 61); the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers USS Laboon (DDG 58) and USS Mahan (DDG 72); and the fast combat support ship USNS Supply (AOE 6). The embarked squadrons of Carrier Air Wing 17 will fly off Dec. 19.
Other units of the Washington CVBG returning later this winter include the guided-missile frigate USS Kauffman (FFG 59), the guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) and the destroyer USS Arthur W. Radford (DD 968) .
During their six-month deployment, George Washington launched approximately 10,000 sorties.
Release Date: 1/13/2004 4:15:00 PM
Commanded by Rear Adm. H. Denby Starling II, commander, Carrier Group 8, the GWCSG includes the Norfolk-based aircraft carrier George Washington with its embarked air wing, Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 7, the Norfolk-based guided-missile cruiser USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), the Norfolk-based guided-missile destroyer USS Bulkeley (DDG 84), and the combat logistics ship USNS Supply (T-AOE 6) from Naval Weapons Station Earle, N.J. HMCS Toronto, a Canadian Halifax-class patrol frigate, will also deploy with the GWCSG. Additionally, the Norfolk-based submarine USS Albany (SSN 753) is a part of the GWCSG.
The above post were Atlantic Fleet groups below are Pacific Fleet groups:
USS Nimitz Battle Group Commences Southern California Training Exercise
Story Number: NNS030113-13
Release Date: 1/14/2003 11:29:00 AM
Joining Nimitz as participants in the exercise will be CCDG-5; CVW-11; Destroyer Squadron 23; Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 11 Detachment (Det) 1; cruisers USS Chosin (CG 65) and USS Princeton (CG 59); guided-missile destoyers USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS Benfold (DDG 65); guided-missile frigate USS Rodney M Davis (FFG 60); destroyer USS Oldendorf (DD 972); attack submarine USS Pasadena (SSN 752); and fast combat support ship USS Bridge (AOE 10).
Nimitz Strike Group Completes JTFEX 05-03
Release Date: 4/6/2005 1:44:00 PM
More than 6,500 Sailors and Marines from Nimitz, Carrier Air Wing 11, Destroyer Squadron 23, USS Princeton (CG 59), USS Higgins (DDG 76), USS Chafee (DDG 90), USNS Bridge (T-AOE 10) and USS Louisville (SSN 724) sharpened their operational skills in preparation for their upcoming summer deployment.
Lincoln Carrier Battle Group Deploys With Numerous Innovations
Release Date: 7/30/2002 10:48:00 AM
The Ticonderoga-class cruisers USS Shiloh (CG 67) and USS Mobile Bay (CG 53) .
Also in the battle group USS Fletcher (DD 992), USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) and USS Reuben James (FFG 57) and the attack submarine USS Honolulu (SSN 718)
San Diego Ships to Depart with USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group
Story Number: NNS041018-08
Release Date: 10/18/2004 3:44:00 PM
-- USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) Carrier Strike Group arrived in San Diego Oct. 16 and will depart Oct. 19 to support Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet potential contingency operations and theater security cooperation initiatives.
The Lincoln Carrier Strike Group will deploy with the following San Diego-based ships: the cruiser USS Shiloh (CG 67), commanded by Capt. Joe Harriss; and the destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65), commanded by Cmdr. Don Hornbeck. Other ships deploying with the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group include the Everett, Wash.-based destroyer USS Shoup (DDG 86), led by Cmdr. Alexander T. Casimes; the Pearl Harbor-based attack submarine USS Louisville (SSN 724), under the command of Cmdr. David Kirk; and the fast combat support ship USS Rainier (AOE 7), based in Bremerton, Wash,.
And so its gone for the last 65 years or so.
How many escorts are necessary?
Of what type and quality?
And maybe more important whats actually available at any given moment in time rather than what would be optimal.
The basic paradigm seems to have changed little.