The myth of missile boat threat?

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16 years 11 months

Posts: 321

There seem to be more experts saying that missile boats don't stand a chance against a modern "blue water" navy like RN/USN etc than vice versa.

A popular argument seems to be that shipboard helicopters would win every time etc.

Is this underestimating the missile boat threat? Do most navies even deploy SSMs on their shipboard helicopters? Missile boats are getting stealthier and their missiles longer ranged and more 'network compatible'. Missile boat fleets are also expanding.

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Discuss :D

Original post

Member for

14 years 11 months

Posts: 89

Unfortunately missile boats make rather naff naval vessels. Great for looking warry and posing with lots of missiles but difficult to use effectively.

They were seen as a cheap way of defeating large vessels but they arn't all that cheap, have limited sensor fits which often don't work particularly well due to poor seakeeping and have great difficulty in protecting themselves.

The trend recently has been more towards corvettes and vessels which offer a bit more than just a bean count of missiles. The missiles themselves are almost irrelevant as you need proper targetting to use them effectively.

The Lynx / Sea Skua combination made mincemeat of the Iraqi attack boats in the Gulf, though as you point out not every Navy has a similar capability.

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20 years 5 months

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It's all a question of target acquisition.

Till a few years ago it was somewhat pointless to put a long-range anti-ship missile with a radar seeker on a stand-alone surface platform. 4K40, Exocet and Penguin (though IR guided) are examples of missiles that fly only a little farther than the radar horizon of the typical FAC. For longer ranges some kind of off-board ISR data was needed, usually provided by high-value or quantitative limited airborne sources, which made putting missiles on the boats somewhat pointless, as you could put them on the aircraft instead. (Not talking about the Red Fleet salvo tactics, though).

The UAV changes all that. Cheap enough to cover large areas by a swarm (well, a very thin swarm currently, but nevertheless), UAVs organic to the FAC dramatically increase the awareness and reach. Now it's not pointless any more to put a SS-N-27 onto an otherwise naked go-fast boat, form a group of them and add another one as UAV launch platform. For size think German S-100 class Schnellboot.

Kamikaze boats do not compute with my civilizatory background, but looking at the Burkes I'd say half a dozen should do the job, especially if not thinned out by ESSM at longer ranges (e.g. due to rules of engagement). The 5" gun doesn't do any good against fast closing targets from multiple vectors, and how good ESSM is with the illuminators looking directly onto the waves is *very* questionable. I'd feel naked without a 35mm Millennium, now that the 20mm Phalanx are gone. Baaad mistake. Would have been the perfect spot for Millenniums.

Thinking that helicopters could stop a spirited and coordinated attack is naive. Number one there are MANPADS that outrange an ATGM or 20mm, number two the helicopter might never see the FAC when stand-off AShMs are used, and number three there are not enough helicopters, especially if they are needed to look for subs and mines at the same time. And then one can only guess what happens at night, since not terribly many shipboard helicopters are night combat capable.
Of course you could put two squadrons of Hellfire equipped Sea Cobras on a LHD and fly barrier patrol, but then you need to protect those against SAMs and fighters -- develops into a serious break-through battle (what is the English word for "Durchbruchsschlacht"?).

In a littoral chokepoint like the Strait of Hormuz I'd say that go-fast boats with fleet torpedoes are actually an almost bigger threat, as AShMs are better put on some truck and positioned inland behind some hill or in a deep hole.

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Of course you could put two squadrons of Hellfire equipped Sea Cobras on a LHD and fly barrier patrol, but then you need to protect those against SAMs and fighters -- develops into a serious break-through battle (what is the English word for "Durchbruchsschlacht"?).

Alternatively, Sea Lynx/Sea Hawk + Sea Skua/Penguin (which have longer range than any MANPADS) and in the timeframe approaching 2020 FLynx + FASGW-H(the project seems to be leaning towards Sea Skua mk.2)

Admittedly the airborne rotary wing may not always see the launch platform before the missiles are fired, however what is to say that CAMM/ESSM + Phalanx/Goalkeeper/Millenium wont destroy the AShM long before it reaches the vessels perimiter? Obviously after launch it's a game of cat and mouse with the FAC/Missile Boat/Corvette and...

Wait, I know this game. It's called cat and mouse, and there's only one way to win; don't be the mouse.
Perfect quote.

Missile Boats are a blatant waste of money considering the slim chance of sucess even in a well coordinated attack.

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19 years 3 months

Posts: 1,620

Missile Boats are a blatant waste of money considering the slim chance of sucess even in a well coordinated attack.

.... and therein lies the rub. A slim chance is all thats needed.

Let's try a scenario out where you have an environment like the Straights of Hormuz with a determined and co-ordinated attack by groups of smaller FAC with say a crew of 20 and armed with 2 missiles. These are supported by longer-ranged truck launched AShM from the coast. Lets say 7 or 8 of these vessels are sunk, but they manage to sink a destroyer with a crew of say 250, with 50% casulaties.

Who has won here? Politically and materially I reckon the defender has. And perhaps after that scenario assets are pulled further away, and more resources are put into combatting the threat. That's also a victory of sorts.

Now, my scenario is based on the premises of relatively cheap smaller boats, and an almost suicide type mission. Yet....... both these conditions, materially and historically, exist in a nation that sits beside the Straights of Hormuz.

Then you have the coastline of Norway for example, that is studded with thousands of islands where a FAC can lurk. The Norwegian Navy recognised this and equipped themselves accordingly.

I think the missile boat still has a very definite role to play, but that would depend on the size, tactics, and coastline from where they operate.

Chaffers
Unfortunately missile boats make rather naff naval vessels. Great for looking warry and posing with lots of missiles but difficult to use effectively.

They were seen as a cheap way of defeating large vessels but they arn't all that cheap, have limited sensor fits which often don't work particularly well due to poor seakeeping

I would not use them as such on the open ocean, but rather for what they are actually designed for - coastal strike in certain environments.

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20 years 10 months

Posts: 490

The UAV changes all that. Cheap enough to cover large areas by a swarm (well, a very thin swarm currently, but nevertheless), UAVs organic to the FAC dramatically increase the awareness and reach. Now it's not pointless any more to put a SS-N-27 onto an otherwise naked go-fast boat, form a group of them and add another one as UAV launch platform. For size think German S-100 class Schnellboot.

A FAC is already chronically short of available deck space. Only larger FACs can handle a heli platform, but that's going to cut significantly into what other weapon/sensor systems can be put on board. Then there's the problem of recovery on a FAC with its poorer seakeeping qualities.

Kamikaze boats do not compute with my civilizatory background, but looking at the Burkes I'd say half a dozen should do the job, especially if not thinned out by ESSM at longer ranges (e.g. due to rules of engagement). The 5" gun doesn't do any good against fast closing targets from multiple vectors, and how good ESSM is with the illuminators looking directly onto the waves is *very* questionable. I'd feel naked without a 35mm Millennium, now that the 20mm Phalanx are gone. Baaad mistake. Would have been the perfect spot for Millenniums.

ESSM was tested in an anti-surface mode in 2007 against a RHIB. Worked fine. No reason why the 5 inch gun won't work extraordinarily well against boats, especially when using specialised force protection rounds like Mk 179 and Mk 182. Finally, there's the Mk 38 mod 2s, standard fit on later Burkes (those without Phalanx Block 1Bs) and being retrofitted to older ones, I believe. Below that there's the miniguns and other small arms fire. So you're looking at a very robust multi-layer solution. After the COLE incident, force protection became a very high priority. The USN didn't sit on its ass doing nothing. Anybody who tries to do a COLE again is probably going to find it a very unrewarding experience. :diablo:

Thinking that helicopters could stop a spirited and coordinated attack is naive.

The Iraqis on the FACs who had to deal with the helis picking them apart would certainly beg to differ.

Number one there are MANPADS that outrange an ATGM or 20mm, number two the helicopter might never see the FAC when stand-off AShMs are used, and number three there are not enough helicopters, especially if they are needed to look for subs and mines at the same time. And then one can only guess what happens at night, since not terribly many shipboard helicopters are night combat capable.

MANPADs do outrange the shorter ATGMs like TOW, but Hellfire, Penguin, Sea Skua which are the common heli launched anti-surface missiles outrange them. And I'm not sure it'd be easy at all to stand and fire off a MANPADs in a FAC doing 30+ knots! Simply put, the vast majority of FACs are totally unequipped to handle helis, and there's a question mark on the performance of the systems on those that do.

Of course you could put two squadrons of Hellfire equipped Sea Cobras on a LHD and fly barrier patrol, but then you need to protect those against SAMs and fighters -- develops into a serious break-through battle (what is the English word for "Durchbruchsschlacht"?).

Why would 2 whole squadrons be needed? Only 1 heli with a EO and radar suite need be up in the air at any one time. In fact, early warning might even come from the mass of voice comms needed for C&C of the boat swarm (not a trivial task).

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18 years 9 months

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...
The Iraqis on the FACs who had to deal with the helis picking them apart would certainly beg to differ. ....

A very poor example. There were a relatively small number of FACs, with a large enemy fleet offshore, no air support whatsoever, pretty much dead if they switched on radars, being hunted by helicopters with massive backup.

Frankly, I find this debate weird. There are so many assumptions being made, so little recognition of particular circumstances.

FACs are a complete waste of money in some circumstances.

FACs have been very effective weapons in some circumstances.

It is being argued here that against a superior blue water fleet with high-quality ISR assets & command of the air, FACs are useless. Well, what a surprise! The big navy can beat the smaller one!

What about against an equivalent force? What if the enemy does not have excellent ISR, or complete command of the air?

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19 years 6 months

Posts: 3,609

A very poor example. There were a relatively small number of FACs, with a large enemy fleet offshore, no air support whatsoever, pretty much dead if they switched on radars, being hunted by helicopters with massive backup.

Frankly, I find this debate weird. There are so many assumptions being made, so little recognition of particular circumstances.

FACs are a complete waste of money in some circumstances.

FACs have been very effective weapons in some circumstances.

It is being argued here that against a superior blue water fleet with high-quality ISR assets & command of the air, FACs are useless. Well, what a surprise! The big navy can beat the smaller one!

What about against an equivalent force? What if the enemy does not have excellent ISR, or complete command of the air?

Well, what examples are there of FAC v. FAC battles in 'recent times', let's say, since 1960 or so.

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20 years 10 months

Posts: 490

There were a relatively small number of FACs, with a large enemy fleet offshore, no air support whatsoever, pretty much dead if they switched on radars, being hunted by helicopters with massive backup.

The small number of FACs and the large enemy fleet offshore are irrelevant to an evaluation of the results of the engagement. This was purely an engagement of Facs against helis. That the FACs were unable to handle the helis without air support is indicative of the fatal flaw of the FACs. As I recall they actually did turn on their fire control radars but were unable to maintain lock. Slight evasive maneuvers by UK helis were enough to break lock because of the poor seakeeping qualities of the FACs. (I think that info came from a very old issue of Naval Forces. That, or Friedman's Navies in the Nuclear Age. Will have to look it up if you want a source.)

FACs are a complete waste of money in some circumstances.

FACs have been very effective weapons in some circumstances.

A more accurate statement would be

"FACs are a complete waste of money in most circumstances.

FACs can be effective weapons in some circumstances."

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18 years 9 months

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Well, what examples are there of FAC v. FAC battles in 'recent times', let's say, since 1960 or so.

October 1973.

But note that I didn't say identical force, I said "equivalent". Not the same thing. A force of similar, or not vastly greater, strength, however equipped, would qualify.

So far, the proponents of the "missile boats are worthless" view have assumed overwhelming superiority of strength & technology by the opponents of missile boats.

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15 years 4 months

Posts: 232

A very poor example. There were a relatively small number of FACs, with a large enemy fleet offshore, no air support whatsoever, pretty much dead if they switched on radars, being hunted by helicopters with massive backup.

Frankly, I find this debate weird. There are so many assumptions being made, so little recognition of particular circumstances.

FACs are a complete waste of money in some circumstances.

FACs have been very effective weapons in some circumstances.

It is being argued here that against a superior blue water fleet with high-quality ISR assets & command of the air, FACs are useless. Well, what a surprise! The big navy can beat the smaller one!

What about against an equivalent force? What if the enemy does not have excellent ISR, or complete command of the air?

thats granted, in a major war between 2 equally major navies where each of them cant get air power to attack the others assets then a sprinted attack by a squadron of FAC's doing 50-60kt's firing a salvo of SSM's at standoff range and retreat (with SSN's on the prowl aswell) may well be a sucessful attack but i'm not entirely sure that modern anti-missile defences cant cope with it.

chance of anything of such scale happening are slim and I hope we'll never see it!

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20 years 5 months

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Taking the events of January 1991 as a yardstick is misleading. In none of these cases the FACs and motorboats that were sunk by Lynx were on a mission against surface units - in fact they were misused as transports and minelayers or just bobbing around.

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19 years 8 months

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Well, there has been a number of clashes between North Korean and South Korean FACs in the recent years. But North Korean missile FACs were never really involved. Light gun boats exchanged fires, and North Korean FACs disengaged and ran off whenever larger corvettes arrived on the scene, with the missile FACs never coming in really close.

Rather, it was always the land-based Samlet and Silkworm batteries that lit up to dissuade the ROKN ships from pursuing.

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14 years 11 months

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If you happen to reside near a shipping choke point (or your evil den / monorail / big wall map complex does) or strategic area and start buying small missile boats then you can expect an awful lot of unwelcome attention from the big boys.

If the Iraqis were using theirs as minelayers then good drills. Thats pretty much their most useful role.

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15 years 7 months

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If the Iraqis were using theirs as minelayers then good drills. Thats pretty much their most useful role.

Sea Skua fodder - see RN Helicopters vs Saddam's Navy

There was a great deal of concern of the threat the Exocet armed missile boats could inflict on Mines Counter Measures forces, hence the drive to remove them from the scene.

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20 years 10 months

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So far, the proponents of the "missile boats are worthless" view have assumed overwhelming superiority of strength & technology by the opponents of missile boats

Doesn't matter. This event simply highlighted the fact that FACs were ineffective, and debunked the promise that FACs were cost effective alternatives to larger vessels. FACs are not capable of carrying a battle management system and incapable of self defense, hence they were restricted to close-to-shore operations. In that case, why not just utilise shore based anti-ship missiles?

Taking the events of January 1991 as a yardstick is misleading. In none of these cases the FACs and motorboats that were sunk by Lynx were on a mission against surface units - in fact they were misused as transports and minelayers or just bobbing around.

They were far from bobbing around'. Some were in fact quite modernly equipped, and they were actively trying to fire back at their harassers. They never managed to mainatain a lock onto the helis.

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FACs are not capable of carrying a battle management system and incapable of self defense, .
Why not? Can you please explain your logics here
:confused:

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I have to admit that the FAC's in question were hardly Gepard class FAC's with RAM missiles for self defense or Saar 4's with their Phalanx......

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Size. FACs are and will always be constrained by size. That has a number of severe implications. First is sensor load. There is a limit in terms of number of sensors that can be placed on board. Even if the sensor fit on a 45m ship is the same as that on a 62m ship, the performance isn't necessarily the same. Why? EM interference issues. More space allows for better antenna locations, giving better performance. Also, because they are small, the radars cannot be located high enough without affecting stability. Thus they are more limited by the horizon and multipathing (and sometimes by the surface ducting phenomenon too).

Next, is the problem of vibration. Because the ships have lower seakeeping performance, and combined with their high speeds, their sensor performance is severely degraded. This was why the Iraqi FACs which were well armed with 76mm and 40mm guns coupled to modern fire control (which theoretically should have been able to take down the helis), ESM and Dagaie decoys were not effective. The UK Lynxes only needed their Orange Crop ESM system to tell them when they were getting painted by the FCR on the Iraqi FACs, and simple maneuvers were sufficient to break lock. Thus the UK Lynxes found that they didn't even need their ALQ-167 ECM, and so these were sacrificed for increased Sea Skua loads. Conversely, even with ESM the radar emmissions of the Lynx needed to paint the FACs for the Sea Skua never seemed to alert the FACs that they were under threat. No decoys were launched. As a side note, the Iraqi FACs were armed with MANPADs too. Only one SA-N-5 was able to be launched, and the Lynx evaded the missile.

Next is survivability. The small size means critical components of the ship must necessarily be situated close together, thus allowing for a catastrophic kill. Sea Skuas were effective even with their small warheads because of this.

You can look at the RSN as a very illuminating example of how FACs fell out of favor. The Sea Wolf class missile Gunboats (45m Lurssen FACs) were replaced by 3,200 ton frigates. There is good reason for such a move. Even the larger Victory class corvettes (62m Lurssen designs) were regarded as less than satisfactory in terms of their stability. Placing the required sensors for combat effectiveness gave it excessive topweight.

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Re: The myth of missile boat threat?

The world feels secure with hard kill countermeasures to the anti-ship missile problem. But, a very large percentage of attacks have been foiled soft-kill countermeasures -chaff, jamming, etc.

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The world feels secure with hard kill countermeasures to the anti-ship missile problem. But, a very large percentage of attacks have been foiled soft-kill countermeasures -chaff, jamming, etc.

True. But the USN, at least, has its reasons for preferring hard kill. There's no point decoying away a missile only to have it continue on and lock on onto a higher value target instead. (Oops :D) I think there was an instance in the Falklands where this exact thing happened? The Atlantic Conveyor being the victim, I think? Jonesy may correct me on this.